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Literature Review

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1 Introduction

In this paper we will provide a brief overview of what we consider to be the three main theoretical approaches to the study of visual surveillance. First, we will look at the sociological literature which has drawn upon Michel Foucault’s reading of the Panopticon in an attempt to assess the impact of the “information revolution” on surveillance processes. Secondly, we will review the “critical” criminological literature which has explored the links between neo-liberal policies and the growing use of actuarially based, risk management approaches to crime control. Thirdly, we consider the work of urban geographers who have focused on some of the broader socio-economic forces that are propelling the growth of this new technology.

2 Sociological perspectives on the Panopticon

As David Lyon has pointed out, the sociological response to the general issue of surveillance has been dominated by images of the Panopticon (Lyon, 1994). This has been especially true of CCTV surveillance which naturally invites comparisons with Jeremy Bentham’s proposal, written in 1787, for an architectural system of social discipline, applicable to prisons, factories, workhouses and asylums. The design of the Panopticon consisted of a central inspection tower surrounded by a ring-shaped building composed of cells, each housing an inmate. Control was maintained by the constant sense that prisoners were watched by unseen eyes. Not knowing whether or not they were under supervision, but obliged to assume that they were, conformity was the individual’s only realistic option. In this respect, the architectural design of the Panopticon created a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assured the automatic functioning of self-control and self-discipline.

Although Bentham’s model prison was never built, it was nonetheless a crucial development for Foucault who believed that the principles of Panopticism would “seep out from their institutional location to infringe non-institutional spaces and populations” (Smart, 1985: 88). The advent of time-space transcending technologies, many writers believe, reflects this dynamic, extending the disciplinary potential of the panopticon to non-institutionalised public space. As Anthony Giddens points out, surveillance refers to two related sorts of phenomena. “One is the accumulation of ‘coded information’, which can be used to administer the activities of individuals about whom it is gathered ... the other sense of surveillance is that of direct supervision of the activities of some individuals by others in positions of authority over them” (1985: 14). In relation to the accumulation of “coded information”, the emergence of powerful computers and
telecommunications networks has allowed for the systematic categorisation of whole populations. Oscar Gandy (1993) refers to this as a “panoptic sort”, whereby individuals in their daily lives as citizens, employees and consumers are continually identified, classified and assessed and the information then used to co-ordinate and control their access to goods and services.

Similarly, for many writers the development of mass CCTV surveillance systems extends the disciplinary potential of panoptic surveillance to wider public space. Historically, the “direct supervision” of individuals has been limited to relatively confined areas, such as small rural communities, or in the enclosed and controlled spaces of modern organisations (Giddens, 1985: 15). However, with the development of modern CCTV systems in public spaces and telecommunications networks the “direct supervision” of the subject population is no longer confined to specific institutional locales, nor does it require the physical co-presence of the observer. In this respect, the power of the panopticon has been dramatically enhanced by technological developments which have allowed the disciplinary gaze to extend further and further across the entire social fabric.

It is hardly surprising, then, given the parallels that can be drawn with CCTV, that many theorists have been drawn to both Foucault’s concept of the Panopticon and his analysis of its disciplinary potential (Bannister et al. 1998; Reeve, 1998). As Fyfe and Bannister (1994) note, CCTV, like the Panopticon, facilitates the power of the watchers over the watched not only by enabling swift intervention to displays of non-conformity but also through the promotion of habituated anticipatory conformity. However, as Norris and Armstrong (1999) have pointed out, the extent to which CCTV surveillance systems mirror these panoptic principles in their operation and effects depends on a number of issues.

First, these writers note that the activities of those monitored by open-street CCTV systems in public spaces are not restricted to an enclosed environment which makes continuous monitoring virtually impossible. In this respect, “anticipatory conformity may be a strictly temporal and spatial phenomenon, with those individuals with deviant intentions shifting the time and place of their activities to outside the camera’s gaze” (1999: 92).

Secondly, Norris and Armstrong (1999) found that the ability to mobilise a rapid response to monitored non-compliance in public space was constrained by two factors: that CCTV operators could not themselves intervene to deal with incidents, and were not in a position to demand intervention by the police. Thus out of a total of 600 hours of
observational research conducted in three CCTV control rooms, these writers witnessed just 45 deployments to deal with monitored non-compliance.

A third issue raised by Norris and Armstrong (1999) in relation to the disciplinary potential of public CCTV systems concerns the problem of classification. As Poster (1990) has pointed out, the disciplinary power of the panopticon is only complete when one-way total surveillance is combined with a detailed “dossier that reflects the history of his deviation from the norm” (1990: 91). As Norris and Armstrong point out, the street population monitored by open street CCTV surveillance systems are unknown to the observer, which means that those watching the screens are unable to systematically identify and classify people in public space. This was reflected in their findings which revealed that only one in thirty three (3 per cent) of the targeted surveillances in public space were based on the personalised knowledge of the security officers. Indeed Norris (2002) has suggested that despite the massive expansion of CCTV surveillance in Britain, the absence of the ability to routinely link a person’s image to their database record places a severe limitation on CCTV as a Panopticon.

### 2.1 The Social Construction of Technology

One of the main strengths of Norris and Armstrong’s (1999) detailed observational study of CCTV control rooms, is that is avoids the “technological determinism” found in much of the writing on electronic communications technologies. In the (administrative) criminological literature, for example, there is a concern with how effective CCTV systems are as a crime prevention measure (e.g. Skinns, 1998; Tilley, 1998). The sociological literature on the Panopticon, on the other hand, aims to show how CCTV systems represent an extension of disciplinary power (Fyfe and Bannister, 1994; Reeve, 1998). One thing that unites these two very different approaches is their tendency to take as given the way CCTV systems are applied in practice. It is assumed that either visual surveillance systems have been introduced to detect and prevent crime or to extend the disciplinary potential of panoptic systems. What is often missing in this literature is a detailed micro-sociological account of the construction and operation of visual surveillance systems in different institutional settings.

As David Lyon has argued, the problem with technological determinism is that “it underestimates both the role of social factors in shaping the technology in the first place, and also the variety of social contexts that mediate its use” (1994: 9). Following Lyon, a number of writers have drawn upon the Social Construction of Technology (SCOT) approach to show that the way surveillance systems are applied in practice depends on how they fit in with the existing social relations, political practices and cultural traditions.
in different locales and institutional settings. As Graham and Marvin (1996: 104) point out, the SCOT approach rejects the notion that technological systems “have some autonomous ‘logic’ which ‘impacts’ on cities as an external force”. Instead, it aims to show how “individuals, social groups and institutions ... have some degree of choice in shaping the design, development and application of technologies in specific cases” (ibid. 105).

In his book, _The Surveillance Web_, for example, McCahill (2002) has shown how visual surveillance systems (in shopping malls, workplaces, and high-rise housing schemes) are shaped by the organisational, occupational and individual concerns of those responsible for setting up and monitoring the systems. Similarly, in their observational study of three CCTV control rooms, Norris and Armstrong (1999) found that video-recorded images “become another resource to be selectively utilised by the police in pursuit of their own organisational goals which are not coincidental with the full enforcement of the law” (1998: 83).

### 2.2 CCTV and the “data subject”

While much of the sociological literature on surveillance has drawn on Foucault’s reading of the Panopticon, other writers have used the work of Baudrillard to argue that it is simulation that represents the crucial omission from contemporary modern accounts of surveillance (Bogard, 1996). Once again, the emergence of information technologies (and, in particular, military initiated simulation technologies) is placed at the centre of analysis. For example, the central argument of _The Simulation of Surveillance_ (Bogard, 1996) is that electronic signs and images of objects and events are replacing their real counterparts. The electronic signs and symbols generated by webs of surveillance produce virtual simulations of “reality” which are then taken to be “reality” by dominant institutions (Graham, 1998: 7). In Bogard’s account, surveillance systems attempt to identify deviance prior to the occurrence of the behaviour or the event in real time. As David Lyon points out, “the Cromatica system that predicts suicide attempts on underground train stations provides a good example”, as does the use of police computer profiles which provide “an advance warning of potential offences” (2001: 116-7).

In the context of CCTV surveillance systems, Stephen Graham (1998) suggests that the rapid expansion of visual surveillance networks in the UK is a good example of the emergence of surveillant-simulation as (attempted) social control. However, while drawing on the idea of “surveillant-simulation”, Graham goes on to suggest that Bogard “fails to explore how practices of surveillant-simulation become embodied in the
production of grounded socio-spatial relations” (Graham, 1998: 8). In order to address this gap Graham looks at how “the growing nexus between systems of surveillance and those of simulation raises major questions about geographical change, social control, patterns of inclusion and exclusion... and the spatial dynamics of the so-called ‘information society’” (1998: 8).

Graham argues that “technological developments towards the digitisation of CCTV, and its linkage with databases, seem likely to lead to much higher degrees of automation and a much greater reliance of linked surveillant-simulation techniques”. Examples of these new technologies include “intelligent scene monitoring” which uses computer-based pattern recognition software to automatically monitor and interpret complex scenes and trigger an alarm when “unusual” events occur. For example, “a stationary vehicle can trigger an alarm as can a person heading in the ‘wrong’ direction” (Norris and Armstrong, 1998: 264). Meanwhile, the ability to store visual information on computerised databases means that cameras can be linked with sophisticated computer software which can convert images into numerical data and automatically match facial features against a pictorial database of known offenders. For instance, Software and Systems International (SSI), claims to have developed “a fully automated facial recognition system based on neural network software ... which can scan the faces of the crowd in ‘real’ time and compare the faces with images of known ‘troublemakers’ held on a digital database” (Norris and Armstrong, 1999: 217).

The combination of cameras and computerised databases, therefore, creates a “digital persona” which eventually leads a life of its own beyond the control and, at times, even the knowledge of the real self (Poster, 1990; Lyon, 1994). Moreover, as Norris and Armstrong (1999) have shown, “these personae have more than just an electronic existence: they have concrete material effects” (Norris and Armstrong, 1999: 221). This was revealed starkly in the case of two Welsh football fans when they were erroneously entered onto the National Football Intelligence Unit’s database of suspected hooligans. As a result, when the two were travelling to an overseas match in Belgium, they were identified by the Belgium police, arrested and deported. In effect, the two were no longer free to travel anywhere in Europe to support their team despite having done nothing wrong because their electronic classification had more import and authority than their real selves (1999: 221).
3 Critical Criminology

While much of the (administrative) criminological literature on CCTV has focused on the issue of how effective visual surveillance systems are as a crime prevention tool, other criminologists have argued that the rapid growth in the use of CCTV is bound up with wider political changes in advanced liberal democracies. Some writers, for example, have drawn upon the “governmentality” literature in an attempt to explore the links between the emergence of neo-liberal policies and the growing use of “actuarial” or “risk-based” strategies of crime control (Stenson and Sullivan, 2001). From the perspective of these writers the emergence of CCTV surveillance systems is just one among a “host of ways in which new powers have … created a new ‘governmentality’. This refers to the new means to render populations thinkable and measurable, through categorisation, differentiation, and sorting into hierarchies, for the purposes of government” (Stenson, 2001: 22-3).

3.1 New Modes of Governance

For most of the 20th century the “rehabilitative ideal” or “treatment model” of crime control dominated criminological discourse in the UK. The “treatment model” was bound up with the image of the powerful and benevolent state, not only empowered, but also obliged to intervene in the lives of individual offenders whose criminal behaviour could be “diagnosed” and “cured”. However, as David Garland (1996: 17) has pointed out, in recent decades “the governance of crime has come to be problematized in new ways, partly in reaction to chronically high crime rates and the failure of criminal justice controls”. Garland notes that on one hand the state appears to be attempting to reclaim the power of sovereign command by the use of phrases like “zero tolerance”, “prison works”, “tough on crime”, and “three strikes”. However, at the same time politicians have attempted to back off from some of the more ambitious claims about the provision of domestic security which characterised criminological discourse for much of the twentieth century. For instance, faced with a growing demand upon the criminal justice system, which appears to have little capacity for greater impact, there has been an increased emphasis upon a preventive response to crime that focuses on “opportunity reduction”, “situational prevention” and “risk management”.

For Garland, the new governmental style is organised around “economic forms of reasoning”. The dominant theme in this new discourse is the image of the “rational actor” who thinks in cost-benefit terms – weighing up the risks, potential gains and potential costs, and then committing an offence only when the benefits are perceived to
outweigh the losses. This new discourse is reflected in the cluster of criminological theories – rational choice theory, routine activity theory and the various approaches that view crime as a matter of opportunity – which view crime as a normal, mundane event, requiring no special disposition or abnormality on the part of the offender (Garland, 1996: 18). The emergence of these theoretical perspectives has witnessed a shift from policies directed at the individual offender, to policies directed at “criminogenic situations”. The latter includes “unsupervised car parks, town squares late at night, deserted neighbourhoods, poorly lit streets, shopping malls, football games, bus stops, subway stations and so on” (Garland, 1999: 19). Clearly, the rapid growth in the use of CCTV surveillance systems fits very neatly with these strategies of risk management.

For Feeley and Simon (1994: 173) the changes described by Garland are part of a paradigm shift in the criminal process from the “Old Penology” to the “New Penology”. The Old Penology was concerned with the identification of the individual criminal for the purpose of ascribing guilt and blame, and the imposition of punishment and treatment. The New Penology, on the other hand, is “concerned with techniques for identifying, classifying and managing groups assorted by levels of dangerousness” (1994: 180) based not on individualised suspicion, but on the probability that an individual may be offender. For Feeley and Simon, justice is becoming “actuarial”, and its interventions increasingly based on risk assessment, rather than on the identification of specific criminal behaviour. As a consequence, we are witnessing an increase in, and legal sanction of, such actuarial practices as preventative detention, offender profiling and mass surveillance (Norris and Armstrong, 1999: p. 25).

The last decade or so has witnessed an exponential increase in the use of new surveillance technologies which are designed to regulate groups as part of a strategy of managing danger. These strategies include such things as testing employees for the use of drugs (Gilliom, 1993), the introduction the blanket DNA testing of entire communities (Nelkin and Andrews, 1999), and, of course, the use of city centre CCTV surveillance systems which seek to regulate groups as part of a strategy of managing danger. The introduction of these new technologies is often justified in terms of their ability to monitor “risk” groups who pose a serious threat to society. However, once these systems are introduced, the concept of dangerousness is broadened to include a much wider range of offenders and suspects (see Pratt, 1999). For instance, the National DNA Database was originally set up in the UK as a forensic source for helping identify those involved in serious crimes (i.e. murder and rape). However, an amendment to the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act (1994) allows samples to be taken without consent from any person convicted or suspected of a recordable offence (Home Office, 1999).
The trend towards more “inclusive” databanking is also evident in those cases involving the retention of samples submitted on a voluntary basis. The police have already conducted 118 “mass screens”, resulting in 48 hits and 7 convictions (Werrett, 1999). Latest figures show that over one million DNA profiles from suspects have been put onto the Database, plus around 73,000 profiles from evidence found at scenes of crime (The Guardian, 1 September, 2000; Forensic Science Service, 2000). Meanwhile, the government recently announced a £109m cash boost for the Database which is expected to see an extra 3m samples added to the DNA database by 2004 (The Guardian, 1 September, 2000).

For some writers these trends are indicative of a broader structural transformation from an industrial society towards a risk society. Ericson and Haggerty (1997), for example, have argued that we are witnessing a transformation of legal forms and policing strategies that reflect the transition to a risk society. As these writers argue:

“Risk society is fuelled by surveillance, by the routine production of knowledge of populations useful for their administration. Surveillance provides biopower, the power to make biographical profiles of human populations to determine what is probable and possible for them. Surveillance fabricates people around institutionally established norms – risk is always somewhere on the continuum of imprecise normality” (1997: 450).

Under these conditions policing becomes increasingly proactive rather than reactive. And, given that risk assessment is probabilistic rather than determinist, it requires the assignment of individuals and events to classificatory schemes which provide differentiated assessment of risk and calls for management strategies. Echoing the concerns of the nineteenth-century positivists, offenders become classified as “prolific” as opposed to opportunistic. Once designated as prolific, an individual becomes a candidate for targeting by more intensive forms of covert technical or human surveillance. What is important here is that the emphasis on risk makes everyone a legitimate target for surveillance: “Everyone is assumed guilty until the risk profile assumes otherwise” (Norris and Armstrong, 1999: p. 24).

In light of these developments we may be tempted to agree with Stan Cohen (1985) when he argued that, "For many visionary ideologues and observers the day is ending for all forms of individual intervention. The real master shift about to take place is towards the control of whole groups, populations and environments – not community control, but the control of communities” (1985: 127).
3.2 Responsibilisation strategies

As a number of writers have pointed out, many of the programmes of practical action which flow from strategies of “risk management”, increasingly are addressed not to central-state agencies such as the police, “but beyond the state apparatus, to the organisations, institutions and individuals in civil society” (Garland, 1996: 451; O’Malley, 1992; Fyfe, 1995). Following the demise of the Keynesian Welfare State in many of the advanced capitalist nations, an emphasis on individual responsibility for managing risk finds converts from all parts of the political spectrum (Barry, et al. 1996: 1). Pat O’Malley (1992) has written of the emergence of a new form of “prudentialism” where insurance against future risks becomes a private obligation of the active citizen. Responsibilisation strategies are also designed to off-load the responsibility for risk management from central government on to local state and non-state agencies and organisations, hence the increasing emphasis on public/private partnerships, inter-agency co-operation, inter-governmental forums and the rapid growth of non-elected government agencies.

The former Conservative government established a series of organisations and projects, such as The Safer Cities programme, whose remit is to act as a focus for the multi-agency crime prevention partnership and to facilitate contact and co-operation between local agencies and interests. In this sense the state takes on the role of providing empowering knowledge and education in order to pass on the necessary skills to responsible citizens. Nowhere was this more evident than in the case of the introduction of CCTV systems. Thus in 1994 the Home Office published a CCTV instruction manual which offered advice to councillors, business people and the police on the need for CCTV, the situations in which it might be useful, and how CCTV systems should be installed. In October of the same year the government launched its CCTV Challenge Competition which received 480 bids. From these bids “more than one hundred schemes received a share of the £5 million funding, with a further £13.8 million levered in from other partnerships” (Davies, 1996: 178).

The CCTV Challenge Competition mobilised an army of Action Groups and Task Forces who were all competing with one another in a frantic race for CCTV. These powerful coalitions drew “elements from the press, the media, the police, local authorities, retailers, insurance companies, surveillance industries and property interests” (Graham and Marvin, 1996). The systems constructed by these “partnerships” also encourages greater communication and liaison between the different actors involved, providing the police with new structures of information exchange and co-operation. In this sense, the growth of CCTV fits neatly with neo-liberal strategies of rule that enable the state “to set up ‘chains of enrolment’, ‘responsibilization’ and ‘empowerment’ to sectors and agencies
distant from the centre, yet tied to it through a complex of alignments and translations” (Barry et al. 1996: 11-12). The composition of such networks allows the state to “govern at-a-distance”, while leaving “the centralised state machine more powerful than before, with an extended capacity for action and influence” (Garland, 1996: 454).

4 Urban geographers

While the sociological and criminological literature reviewed above has focused on some of the technological and political developments that are propelling the CCTV revolution, a number of urban geographers have focused on the relationship between the introduction of new surveillance systems and the changing nature of contemporary urbanism (Davis, 1990, 1992; Christopherson, 1994; Bannister et al. 1998). For instance, in an article entitled Closed circuit television and the city, Bannister et al. (1998) argue that we should regard CCTV not as the latest silver bullet of crime prevention, but “as a symbol of the current urban malaise” (1998: 22). In order to progress this argument, these writers begin by rejecting a popular myth: “a myth which encourages us to regard crime as the cause of public disorder” (ibid. 22).

The real cause of public disorder, Bannister et al. argue, arises “from an inability to cope, or lack of desire to cope, with ‘difference’” (ibid. 22). Historically the city has been viewed as a place that fosters interaction, diversity and social justice. By encountering difference and intermingling with strangers, our experience of the city was not only enriched; it also gave rise to a set of unconscious and voluntary controls that helped keep the public peace. As Jane Jacobs (1961) states:

“The first thing to understand is that public peace – the sidewalk and the street peace – of cities ... is kept primarily by an intricate, almost unconscious, network of voluntary controls and standards among people themselves, and enforced by people themselves” (Jacobs, 1961; quoted in: Bannister et al. 1998: 23).

However, for many writers these informal networks and processes of voluntary controls have begun to break down. For instance, the possibility for chance encounters with strangers in contemporary cities has been reduced by the development of segregated residential, retail and business areas, and the privatisation of public space (Norris and Armstrong, 1999: 23). As Richard Sennett (1990: 201) points out, today the shopping mall is situated far from tracts of housing, the school is on its own “campus”, and factories are hidden in the industrial park. These techniques, Sennett argues, are “increasingly used in the city centre to remove the threat of classes or races touching, to create a city of secure inner walls” (ibid. 201). These processes of city planning with its emphasis on zoning into segregated residential, retail and business areas, and the
privatisation and commodification of space epitomised by the development of the shopping mall, have seen these traditional forms decay. As space becomes subservient to the interests of business and defined by an “ecology of fear” difference is not something to be celebrated but to be managed, segregated, and excluded (Bannister et al. 1998).

The nature of public sociability in urban areas has also been transformed by the emergence of a "stranger society" (Bannister et al. 1998; Norris and Armstrong, 1999). Social and geographic mobility aided by the development of mass transportation systems “has meant that people no longer spend their lives in the communities into which they were born and brought up” (1999: 21). The decline of traditional communities and the demise of stable employment patterns “results in a significant drop in information, about neighbours, acquaintances, or chance encounters in the street” (Young, 1999: 70). As Young argues, “less direct knowledge of fellow citizens ... leads to much less predictability of behaviour” and a greater wariness in our “stance towards others” (ibid. 70). In this respect, individualisation contributes to an intensification of social isolation, insecurity and the “fear of difference” (Bannister et al. 1998).

In the past public space not only provided an arena for “the celebration of difference”, it was also conceived as democratic space in the sense that access was not dependent on status, but guaranteed by virtue of being a citizen. These democratic spaces, the streets, parks and squares facilitate interactions which “synthesize new cultures, alternative ways of living and popular forces occasionally strong enough to upset entrenched status quos” (Flusty, 1994: 12). In recent years, a number of writers have identified some broad socio-economic trends that are leading to the erosion of democratic public space. Today, these writers argue, public space is being reconstituted, not as an arena for democratic interaction, but as the site of mass consumption (Davis, 1990; Flusty, 1994).

In the United States, for example, Mike Davis has shown how the development of secured “skyway” systems and “gated communities” are eliminating “the democratic admixture on the pavements” (1990: 231). In some cities “overstreet malls” have “created a virtual spatial apartheid in the city, with middle-class whites above, and blacks and poor people below” (Boddy, 1992: 141). Urban geographers have identified similar trends in the UK where the development of gated residential communities, the private policing of semi-public space, and the deployment of CCTV systems “should also be seen as part of the fortress impulse” (Bannister et al. 1998: 27). As Bannister et al. (1998: 27) point out, “the message carried within this form of urban management is clear: difference is not so much to be celebrated as segregated, difference carries less value than it does danger”.


4.1 The exclusionary impulse in the consumer city

Any attempt to understand the forces that are shaping contemporary cities must also look beyond a purely local perspective to the broader global political and economic changes that are restructuring city economies. As writers like David Harvey (1989) have shown, the end of the long post-war boom in western capitalist societies has triggered a massive restructuring which has radically altered cities. Globalisation and the intensification of global competition have torn away the traditional industrial fabric of many western cities through de-industrialisation (Graham and Marvin, 1996: 33). The effects of these developments have been most pronounced at the urban level where the construction of new urban spaces of consumption has been an almost universal response to de-industrialisation (Bianchini et al. 1991).

Thus over the last two decades “managerialism”, so characteristic of urban governance during the era of the Keynesian Welfare State, has been replaced by “entrepreneurialism” as the main motif of urban action. This shift in urban politics is reflected in Britain which over the past 15 years has seen a crucial change in emphasis from an urban policy justified as a form of welfare initiative, to one based on functional economic terms aiming to introduce growth to areas of depression or industrial decline. Increasingly therefore budgets are being set-aside for image construction and advertising to extol the virtues of the city as a favourable business environment. This commodification of the city is now considered a requisite strategy in local economic development to lure external investment into the city.

It is against this background that Town Centre Managers and “image makers” are promoting the use of city centre CCTV surveillance systems as a means of providing a “risk free” environment designed to attract consumers and tourists. In one of the cities in Norris and Armstrong’s (1998) study, for example, a promotional video of the CCTV system “emphasised not the detection of crime but the role CCTV was to play in revitalising the city centre’s flagging fortunes by contributing to the ‘feel good factor’ and encouraging the shopper back to the centre” (1998: 46). Similarly, in their campaign for city centre CCTV, Glasgow District Council used “the slogan ‘CCTV doesn’t just make sense – it makes business sense’. It was claimed Citywatch would encourage 225,000 more visits to the city a year, creating 1,500 jobs and an additional £40 million of income to city centre businesses” (Fyfe and Bannister, 1994: 30).

However, as town centres are increasingly portrayed as places of consumption for tourists and consumers the most recent phase of capitalist economic restructuring has generated levels of unemployment and homelessness not seen since the 1930’s. The
visibility of unemployed or homeless people on the streets or hanging around in shopping centres constitutes a crisis in the city's official representation and obstructs belief in the positive vision that the image-makers attempt to portray. In his book, *Crime Control as Industry*, Nils Christie says in the 1990's:

"Poverty has again become visible. The homeless and the unemployed are out in the streets. They hang around everywhere dirty, abusive, provocative in their non-usefulness. We get a repetition of what happened in the 1930's, only more so since the inner cities have been rebuilt since then. Hiding places in slums and dark corners have been replaced by heated arcades leading into glittering shopping paradises. Of course homeless and/or unemployed persons also seek these public alternatives to the places of work and homes they are barred from. And as an equal matter of course they are met with agitated demands to get them out of sight and out of mind" (1993: 66).

The desire to exclude undesirables from the new territories of consumption has led some to worry that CCTV may be used for the "moral regulation" of city centres. Geoff Mulgan (1989), for example, argues that “there is a danger that attempts to create a ‘convivial milieu’ for economic and socio-cultural life in the city using CCTV may become attempts to purify space of those ‘troublesome others’ – the underclass, the homeless, the unemployed – reducing exposure to what Sennet (1990) describes as ‘the presence of difference’” (quoted in Fyfe and Bannister, 1994: 11). As Norris and Armstrong (1998: 45) have reported, “targeting of the homeless, the vagrant and alcoholic ... was a regular feature” in two of the sites in their observational study of three CCTV control rooms. Moreover, these groups were targeted not because they caused any trouble or were engaged in criminal activities, but because of their “capacity to convey a negative image of the city”.

Other empirical work seems to confirm the view that CCTV systems are being used mainly to target those groups that are “out of place” in the new territories of consumption. For instance, Norris and Armstrong (1998: 85) found that “Nine out of ten targeted surveillance’s were on men, particularly if they are young or black”. Meanwhile, the Local Consultative Committee that was instrumental in pushing for the CCTV system in Wolverhampton argued that “large groups, usually of young single people, simply assemble in places that happen to catch their fancy. Their mere presence is a nuisance to people who want to use the streets and shopping centres in a more conventional way...” (quoted in Graham and Marvin, 1996: 20). Finally, Bulos et al. (Bulos, 1995: 9) have reported that the use of CCTV to revive a town centre in their study resulted in “young people being displaced by town centre improvement schemes to ... environments which are unsafe for them such as alleyways and subways".
As Sibley (1995) points out, "it is not adolescent males as a social category, or even ‘unruly’ groups of young people per se, who are seen as threatening; rather, it is their presence in spaces which comprise part of ‘normal family space’ which renders them discrepant and threatening" (1995: xii). According to Zygmunt Bauman (1997: 14), these flawed consumers are:

“the dirt of post-modern purity ... people unable to respond to the enticements of the consumer market because they lack the required resources ... They are the new ‘impure’, who do not fit into the new scheme of purity. Looked at from the now dominant perspective of the consumer market, they are redundant – truly ‘objects out of place’” (1997: 14).

For some writers the exclusionary impulse means that public spaces are increasingly being replaced by pseudo-public spaces like those in shopping malls. In his study of Town Centre Management (TCM) schemes, for example, Reeve suggests that these initiatives are intended to "attract a spending public in preference to those perceived as anti-social and ‘unaesthetic’" (1996: 18). As one retailer put it (We want to) “make the town centre a place for the family to have a day out – a place of leisure and retail”.

Also, in his survey of town centre managers Reeve (1996: 75) found that a third of respondents had “new powers to ensure that inappropriate activities and uses do not occur”. Many of these new powers focus on restricting or prohibiting drinking in public places. In Glasgow, for example, a blanket ban on drinking alcohol in public places was introduced in August 1996.

Kevin Robins (1995: 61) believes that “we must consider the implications of these developments – the scale of the metropolis, its fragmentation, the fortification of space, the surveillance cameras, and so on – for the collective emotional life of the city”. He asks, “when we no longer live the complexities of the city directly and physically, how much more difficult does it become to cope with reality of those complexities” and “to what extent does such insulation ... encourage paranoid and defensive mechanisms?”

According to Spitzer (1987: 50) “The more we enter into relationships to obtain the security commodity, the more insecure we feel; the more we depend upon the commodity rather than each other to keep us safe and confident, the less safe and confident we feel...” (quoted in Ericson 1994: 171).

Thus while the introduction of CCTV systems is cited by many politicians and practitioners as an effective way of reducing crime and the widespread “fear of crime”, many writers believe that such strategies are adding to the fear and insecurity already brought about by wider processes of “deregulation” and “privatisation”. Bauman (1997: 204), for example, suggests that as expenditures on collective welfare are cut, “the costs
of police, prisons, security services, armed guards and house/office/car protection grows unstoppably”. The only winner in this shift of resources from welfare to law and order, according to Bauman, is “the universally shared and overwhelming sensation of insecurity” (ibid. 204).
5 References


Davis, Mike (1990): City of Quartz, London: Vintage


