

**On the Threshold to Urban Panopticon?
Analysing the Employment of CCTV in European
Cities and Assessing its Social and Political Impacts**



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**CCTV Systems in London
Their Structures and Practices**

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Table of contents

1	INTRODUCTION.....	2
1.1	CCTV IN LONDON	2
1.2	CCTV IN WANDSWORTH	3
1.3	SAMPLE AND METHODOLOGY.....	5
2	THREE CASE STUDIES.....	7
2.1	A PUBLIC CCTV NETWORK	7
2.2	MAINLINE RAILWAY CCTV NETWORK.....	12
2.3	WEST LONDON MALL	16
3	OBSERVATION ORDER OF SOUTH LONDON SHOPPING MALL	22
3.1	INTRODUCTION	22
3.2	ORGANISATION OF VIDEO SURVEILLANCE.....	23
3.3	THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF SUSPICION.....	26
3.4	SUMMARY	41
4	DISCUSSION.....	44
5	BIBLIOGRAPHY	47

1 Introduction

This paper examines the practice of video surveillance in the publicly accessible spaces of London and has two main aims. Firstly, to present case studies of the use of CCTV in three different settings – an open-street CCTV system, a transport system (mainline railway station), and West London Mall. Secondly, the paper provides a detailed observational study of South London Mall based on 120 hours of observation in a CCTV control room. However, before presenting our findings from this empirical research, we will provide a brief overview of CCTV in the publicly accessible spaces of London and Wandsworth (see McCahill & Norris 2002 for a more detailed account) and give a brief outline of some of the methodological issues involved in this study.

1.1 CCTV in London

Over the last decade, London has witnessed a huge increase in the use of CCTV cameras in publicly accessible space. For instance, following the IRA's terrorist attack on Bishopgate in 1993 a network of cameras was introduced to monitor the entrances to the City of London known as the 'ring of steel'. This system has now been integrated with many of the cameras operating in the City's banks and offices. 'Camerawatch', as it is known, was set up following a meeting with some 400 organisations and involves 373 systems with over 1200 cameras (CCTV Today, November 1995: 28). The capital's busiest shopping area, Oxford Street, is also covered by a £500,000 CCTV system consisting of 35 cameras which are monitored from a centralised control room located in Marylebone police station (CCTV Today, 1997: 3). Similarly, the Parliamentary estate is monitored by a network of 260 CCTV cameras (POST, 2002). However, it's not just central London that has witnessed a rapid increase in the use of CCTV systems. For example, in their fictional account of 'an everyday story of video surveillance', Norris and Armstrong (1999) estimated that in a single day a citizen of London could expect to be 'filmed by over three hundred cameras on over thirty separate CCTV systems' (1999: 42).

While there are no government records that would allow us to state the exact number of cameras in the UK, there are figures on central government funding of CCTV which give us some idea of the extent to which surveillance is becoming ubiquitous in public spaces. Between 1994 and 1999, the four rounds of the government's CCTV Challenge Competition raised £85 million to secure the capital funding of 580 CCTV schemes, £31 million from Home Office Funding and £54 million from the partnerships (CCTV Today, November 1995: 4). Under the Crime Reduction Programme CCTV Initiative, £153 million of capital funding was available to crime and disorder reduction partnerships in England and Wales for new and extended public area CCTV schemes. The first round of the initiative was launched in May 1999 and expenditure was expected to reach £64 million (Hansard, 18 January 2000). London has done particularly well in the bidding

process for centrally funded CCTV. For example, in the second round of the Crime Reduction Programme (announced on 31 March 2000) awards amounting to £79 million were made to partnerships. The successful partnerships included a total of 22 London Boroughs who between them bid for a total of £17,883,343 (Crime Reduction CCTV Initiative).

1.2 CCTV in Wandsworth

The construction of Wandsworth's public CCTV network began in the late 1980's when housing and traffic management systems were installed by the local council. In September 1987, a concealed CCTV system was installed on the Goulden House Estate, Battersea, in an attempt to reduce graffiti and other problems on the estate. One year later the council announced that they were to extend this system by introducing a 'microwave' link that would be used to relay pictures from remote camera installations to a centralised control room (WBC, 1988). The total cost, including equipment and staffing, was estimated to be £150,000. Meanwhile, in November 1989 a pilot traffic surveillance scheme using two cameras with monitoring facilities was undertaken (WBC, 1990). Following this a report by the Director of Technical Services proposed to integrate the traffic management system with the three main police divisions in the borough. The images from seven remote cameras in strategically placed areas were to be relayed back to monitors in the Divisional Centres of Wandsworth, Tooting and Battersea, although the council CCTV operator 'would have priority over all cameras at all times' (WBC, 1990).

During the 1990's, the council made three successful bids (one in 1996 and two in 1997) to the Home Office CCTV Challenge Competition. One councillor has estimated that between 1991 and 2001 the council's borough-wide expenditure on CCTV was £2,000,000 (Wandsworth Town Centre Newsletter, 2001). The borough's Crime Watch Manager, on the other hand, estimates that the council has spent around £5 million on its public CCTV network over the last ten years. Today all five of the borough's main town centre areas – Balham, Clapham Junction, Putney, Tooting and Wandsworth – are covered by open-street CCTV. There is also extensive use of video surveillance in all the borough's tube stations and on the major roads. Meanwhile, in our sample of Wandsworth institutions (see McCahill & Norris 2002) we found that CCTV was used in the hospital, public school, social welfare/benefits office, unemployment office, metro/underground, car park, shopping mall, chain store, pharmacy, bank, post office, hotel, cinema, petrol station, and public house.

CCTV in Wandsworth – A Summary

- 1989 – First successful prosecution for criminal damage using CCTV tape as evidence on a housing estate (Goulden House).
- 1992 – CCTV in Wandsworth Town Centre – one of the first schemes in London.

- 1993 – Joint CCTV strategy adopted, incorporating a Code of Practice – one of the first in the UK.
- 1993 – CCTV in Balham and Tooting Town Centres introduced, with links to a Town Hall Control Room and to Tooting Police Station.
- 1996 – Successful bid for 1996 Home Office CCTV Challenge Competition funding for the first phase of a major CCTV installation in Battersea Park.
- 1996 – CCTV in Putney Town Centre – 6 cameras in strategic locations.
- 1996 – Battersea Division first Police Division to have CCTV in intelligence unit for the purposes of disrupting and detecting crime and disorder.
- 1997 – CCTV in Clapham Junction Town Centre – 9 cameras in key locations, with a further three planned for 1997/98.
- 1997 – Two successful bids for 1997 Home Office CCTV Challenge Competition funding for the Patmore and Surrey Lane Housing Estates.
- 1997 – Updated, comprehensive CCTV Code of Practice for the Town Centre camera installations introduced following public consultation. Separate Code of Practice for CCTV on Housing Estates.
- 1997 – SRB Round 1 Safer Shopping Project implemented. £120,000 invested in additional CCTV, and new Business and Pub Watches launched.
- 1997 – CCTV monitoring point installed in Wandsworth Police Divisional Intelligence Unit.

Between 1998 and 2001, the council has added 32 cameras to its public domain CCTV network. According to the council's Crime and Disorder Report, the system now directly accounts for an average of 2 recorded arrests every day of the year (Wandsworth Borough Council, 1998; Crime and Disorder Audit Report).

1.3 Sample and Methodology

For the empirical part of this study we conducted case studies in four different settings: Wandsworth's public CCTV network (open-street and housing), a mainline railway station, West London Mall and South London Mall. These case studies were based on interviews with managers and front-line operatives on the different sites and observational research in the CCTV control rooms.

Table 1: Institutional sample¹

Area	Institution	Status	Number
Open-street/Housing	Wandsworth Council	Managers	3
Transport	South West Trains	Managers	3
Shopping Mall	West London Mall	Managers/Operatives	4
Shopping Mall	South London Mall	Managers/Operatives	13
Total Interviews			23

Table 2: Observation sample

Area	Institution	Time
Open-street/Housing	Wandsworth Council	'Flashlight' Observation
Transport	South West Trains	'Flashlight' Observation
Shopping Mall	West London Mall	'Flashlight' Observation
Shopping Mall	South London Mall	120 Hours

In our study of Wandsworth's public CCTV network we began by conducting interviews with two senior council officers who are both employed by Wandsworth Council's Technical Services Department. One of these officers is the borough Crimewatch Manager. Following this we interviewed the borough's Town Centre Manager at his office which is located in South London Mall. In terms of access, the names of these people were given to us during Work Package 3 when telephone interviews were conducted with some of the 'key players' in the borough. These interviews were followed by a visit to Wandsworth council's CCTV control room. During these interviews we managed to collect a wide range of documentary sources on Wandsworth's public CCTV network. These included a Crime Reduction Strategy, Crime and Disorder Audit Report, Crime and Disorder Action Plan, the borough's CCTV Code of Practice, and council proposals for the funding of CCTV systems in housing and traffic management.

¹ The interview sample includes formal (one hour) tape recorded interviews and informal conversations with front line operatives during control room observations.

In our second case study we interviewed the Security and Information Manager and Control Centre Manager for South West Trains, and had brief conversations with another Security Manager who was present at the time of the interview. Following these interviews, 'flashlight' observations were conducted in the central control room at Wimbledon train station.

Our third case study was based on interviews with managers and front-line operatives at West London Mall. The first point of contact was with the manager of the shopping mall who advised us to contact the mall's Operations Manager. During our visit to the mall we interviewed the Operations Manager and one of Duty Managers, and this was followed by a 'flashlight' observation of the CCTV control room where further informal interviews were conducted with a Senior Contracts Manager and a CCTV operator.

For our final, in-depth, case study, we chose South London Shopping Mall. We began by conducting two interviews, one with the shopping mall's Marketing Executive and one with a Senior Supervisor employed by the contracted Security Company responsible for operating the CCTV system. Following this we completed 120 hours of observation in the shopping mall's CCTV control room (15 × 8-hour shifts). During the period of observational research, brief interviews (i.e. informal conversation) were conducted with all 12 of the security officers (including further conversations with the Senior Supervisor mentioned above) employed by the private security company. This allowed us to collect the qualitative and quantitative data we needed to present our detailed observational study of a London shopping mall.

2 Three Case Studies

2.1 A Public CCTV Network

Organisation of video surveillance

The first open-street CCTV system in the London Borough of Wandsworth was installed in Wandsworth Town Centre in 1992. Today all five of the borough's main town centre areas – Balham, Clapham Junction, Putney, Tooting and Wandsworth – are covered by the system, as the borough's Crime Watch Manager revealed:

'The five areas are our main shopping parades. They also happen to be where the majority of the rail and bus interchanges are. So it's the five areas in the borough that have the highest concentration of what you call non-resident public conglomerations of people coming together for whatever reason, be it shopping, be it commuting, be it just travelling through one place to another. So the five areas are where CCTV is most needed and most likely to be effective' (Crime Watch Manager).

Wandsworth Borough's public CCTV network currently consists of approximately 250 cameras. Around 90 of these are open-street cameras, while the remaining 160 have been installed in the borough's housing estates. According to a senior council officer, the majority of open-street cameras are pan/tilt/zoom, 'whereas on the housing estates the vast majority are fixed cameras which are internal to the housing blocks'. As the Crime Watch Manager explained, over the last ten years the council has spent around £5 million on its public CCTV network. The bulk of this funding came from a combination of housing revenue and what he calls 'the Crimewatch Capital Programme', although the council has also received 'something like £400,000 of Challenge Fund money'. The revenue costs are estimated to be 'in the region of £200,000 a year' (Crime Watch Manager).

Up until two years ago, the images from both the open-street cameras and the housing estate cameras were relayed to separate CCTV control rooms. However, the images from both systems are now relayed to a new CCTV control room which is situated in the council's Technical Services Department. The new control room is about 40ft long and 20ft wide and, as one would expect, contains what looks like brand new furniture (desks and chairs) and brand new equipment. The main control desk includes three brand new joystick control panels (Petards) for the open-street cameras, one control panel (Molynx) for the housing estate system, and a computerised touch screen panel that is used to pull any of the images down on to the 'working monitor'. There is also a new PC on the main desk which is used for communication with the outside world, including the exchange of e-mails with members of the Housing Estate Management team. On the right hand side of the control room there is the 'replay suite' which consists of a desk with two monitors for the purpose of reviewing tapes.

There are 27 monitors in total displaying a combination of coloured and black and white images from both the open-street cameras and housing estate cameras. There are six monitors on the main desk and 21 monitors on the back wall including one huge screen in the middle of the wall. The system employs 'time-lapse' recording of all circuits, although 'real time' recording may occur from time to time. As the Crime Watch Manager explained, it was only recently that the images from the system were monitored on a regular, although not a continuous, basis:

'Until about fifteen months ago the council had no staffing in the control room. All the cameras were on pre-set positions. We recorded 24/7, so the only real use of the system was after any event where people would come in and take any evidence items that were needed. Eighteen months ago we took the decision that that wasn't enough and it was decided we needed a monitoring presence at least during peak population hours, and midnight to early morning there's not a lot going on. The town centres are closed down. You have traffic going through but it's minimal compared to what's happening at day time, and people on the housing estates tend to be asleep. But one the questions we're putting to the members is whether they want 24 hour staffing' (Crimewatch Manager).

Thus, while the images are recorded 24 hours a day, 365 days a year the system is only monitored from 8.00am till midnight.

The publicly declared intentions of the system are stated in the borough's code of practice as follows:

- The purpose of the scheme is to assist in reducing crime and the fear of crime by helping to provide a safer environment for those people who live and work in the area and for visitors travelling through the area.
- To deter crime and to provide public reassurance.
- To detect, prevent or reduce the incidence of street crime against the person (Wandsworth Borough Council, November 2001).

The system is also used for limited 'covert operations' for 'the prevention and detection of crime' or 'the apprehension and prosecution of offenders' (Wandsworth Borough Council, 2002: 10). Meanwhile, the Crime Watch Manager reported that the system is also used for 'street cleansing' and 'traffic management':

'What we do is we do one off jobs for street cleansing. We only do it in areas where they have defined reported problems with a contractor. It's just more or less a survey of an area just to see how often or how well it's cleaned. We also do survey work for the traffic engineers, Transport for London, where we'll put a camera on a defined spot for a period of time, record it in real time, and give them the tape for analysis. Traffic counts, pedestrian counts, traffic movement at junctions, sequencing of traffic lights' (Crime Watch Manager).

The legal framework for the operation of the system is documented in the latest version of the Code of Practice. This document is intended to take account of the impact of the Human Rights Act 1998 and the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000. As the Code of Practice states, the council has registered the system with the Information

Commissioner, and 'individuals have the right to access any personal information which is held on them by the council'. This information is provided 'upon completion of the relevant documentation and payment of the current fee, unless such disclosure would prejudice criminal enquiries or criminal proceedings' (Wandsworth Borough Council, November 2001). Signs to the effect that continuous CCTV monitoring is taking place in the borough are also displayed in areas covered by the system. The signs also comply with recent Data Protection legislation, as they 'state the purpose for which surveillance is taking place, identify the council as the operator of the system and give details of how individuals can contact the council with any queries about the system' (ibid.: 9-10).

Communication Links

In terms of communication links, the images displayed by the CCTV cameras can be relayed to several people outside of the control room. For instance, the council's Emergency Services Department, three local police stations, a Traffic Management control room, and the Director of the Technical Services Department's office (because a previous Director liked 'to keep an eye on his borough') are all, what a council officer described as, 'slave' users of the system. This means that they all have remote facilities that allow them to select any three real time video images to appear on local monitors. Of course, CCTV operators can also decide to send images to these remote sources. As the Crime Watch Manager explained: 'if we've got our finger on the pulse we can ring them and say we're sending you through this picture ... We can physically say: "Putney police station look at monitor three". And we can control what they see'. Having a police presence in the control room helps the CCTV operators decide when it is appropriate to relay images to the police:

'Our operators are really assisted by the fact that there's a police officer in the control room for the full daytime shift every day. So they get the feel from the police of the kind of situation that the police officer's relaying through to control and they can kind of pick up on that. That's one of the best things about having the coppers in there. One major problem with not having the police would be not having police intelligence. The police know who they're looking for. They've got people who they're looking for even before they've done something' (Crime Watch Manager).

The reason for relaying images to a separate control room for the purposes of 'traffic management is:

'so we can have a clear demarcation between the community safety use of the cameras and the enforcement use of the cameras. So there can be no accusation at all that our staff are being distracted from what they're doing to effectively raise money. There are a limited number of cameras being used for that and our guys in the control room have got an override. So if the bus lane guys are monitoring a bus lane and we need to use that camera for our purposes they get thrown off the system'.

There are also several radio links that allow two-way communication between the CCTV operators and others involved in Wandsworth's CCTV network. There is a police radio

which means that the police officers in the control room 'can talk to any other police officer and also to the dispatch room in Tooting'. This means that during unfolding incidents the CCTV operators 'have "hotlines" to dispatch. But what tends to happen when the police are in is that they'll just use the police radio to put the call through instantly' (Crime Watch Manager). There is also handset which allows the operators to contact Housing Estate Services people if there are any problems on the housing estates.

The control room also has a handset for a borough wide Retail Radio Link. This allows the CCTV operators to communicate with local beat officers who carry a handset whilst patrolling the streets. There are also approximately 175 businesses (around 35 in each of the borough's five town centres) on the radio link. Although the council paid for the capital costs of setting up the system, businesses pay a subscription fee each year which covers replacement and renewal of handsets. The Crime Watch Manager explains how the system works in practice:

'What we've got is a local receiver station in each of the town centres. That's hard-wired back to here, so we've got overall control of the system. Town centre's can talk to any other subscriber in that town centre, but we can also put them through to other retailers in other town centre. So if Marks and Spencer's, Clapham Junction, for some reason, wants to alert Marks and Spencer's Tooting, or Marks and Spencer's Putney, we can send the signal from control. On the radio system the town centres have to be patched to each other because they all use different frequencies ... we spotted a guy in Tooting who had a history of shoplifting and a bit of credit card theft. We're watching him in Tooting, while he was acting suspiciously he didn't actually do anything. But he then got onto a bus out of Tooting and because we were able to pick up on the bus number we could pretty much radio head and tell the police officers around about there to look out for him' (Crime Watch Manager).

Also on the Retail Radio system are the borough's Street Patrollers who work within the Leisure and Amenity Services Department. The Street Patrollers have completed five weeks training which included one week run by the Home Office. They became operational on the 7th May 2002 and work very closely with their colleagues in the Metropolitan Police at Lavender Hill Police Station and the Council's CCTV control room. Like other private street patrollers in the UK, they have the same powers as any citizen in this country which can under certain circumstances include power of arrest. They can also enforce certain local bye-laws and other acts including litter, abandoned vehicles and dog bye-laws. During the first four weeks the patrollers dealt mainly with incidents involving fly tips (24 cases), untaxed vehicles (22), drunk and disorderly people (19), damaged paving slabs (15), vagrants (13), reports of drug dealing (12), abandoned vehicles (11), injured people (9) and shoplifters (7).

The main strengths of the CCTV system, according to the Crime Watch Manager, are the deterrent effect and public reassurance. However, he also suggests that there have been 'instances where street robberies have been displaced to areas that are just outside the

camera zones'. This is supported by a council document (*Crime and Disorder Audit Report*) which stated that:

'The increase [in street crime] in the last three years has been accompanied by a greater spread across the borough. From being an offence most prevalent around town centres, the offence has moved along the thoroughfares. Possible reasons for this are CCTV coverage causing displacement and changes in the nature of the crime with huge increases in mobile phone theft' (Wandsworth Borough Council, September 2001: 12).

Organisation of work within the control room

The CCTV system is monitored by a combination of council officers and police officers. The council has an agreement with the police that they will have a minimum of one police officer shift per day in the control room. On the day I visited the control room there were two council officers on duty and one police officer. In addition to having one police officer in the control room each day for one eight-hour shift, there are also a number of 'light duties officers' working in the control room, as the Crimewatch Manager explains:

'we've got a succession of "light duties officers" who are injured in one way or another or aren't fit for full street duties. So as a way of breaking them back into full police work, and to let them feel that they are making some contribution to the great cause, they're put on full shifts or limited shifts in the control room. At the moment we've got one guy who's doing a full shift each day, and three other officers who are either doing full shifts or part shifts for a limited time period. But as far as I'm aware we're the only borough in London that has got a formal staffing partnership with the police. All the others are either a hundred per cent police, a hundred per cent council, or some combination of council and private contract staff' (Crimewatch Manager).

Two of the three council officers who work in the control room have had limited experience of working CCTV systems in previous jobs in the security industry. All three have received a combination of in-house and police training. This has been handled by a senior council officer from the Technical Services Department and the police:

'We're training them up on the camera system, the geography of the town centre's, where the cameras are, use of the radio systems, when to call the police, when not to call the police, what to do in certain situations' (Crimewatch Manager).

The manager of the system is the Crimewatch Manager. He works for the Council's Crimewatch Division and oversees daily tape changing and review, daily liaison with the divisional CAD (Computer Aided Dispatch) room, fault identification and repair instigation.

2.2 Mainline Railway CCTV Network

Organisation of video surveillance

For our case study of the use of CCTV on a major transport system we chose South West Trains. The company runs 1,690 trains every weekday and employs around 4,500 staff. It is estimated that 132 million passenger journeys a year are made on the network which runs through Hampshire, Surrey, Dorset, Wiltshire, Berkshire, Devon, Somerset, Cornwall, East and West Sussex and Greater London (South West Trains, 18 March 2003). The first CCTV cameras were installed in the early 1990's in the car parks of train stations at Woking, Basingstoke and Southampton. As one company employee stated, 'we thought if we can show that CCTV reduces crime in these two "hot spots" we could then spread the use of CCTV to other stations'. The employee goes on to point out that 'in the first three to six months of installing the cameras at these stations crime was reduced by 50% to 75%' (SW Trains employee).

Today 131 (out of 176) train stations have CCTV systems in operation. This includes a total of 1,385, mainly fixed, CCTV cameras (approximately 71 P/T/Z cameras). The revenue or maintenance costs of the systems are £800,000 a year. The extent of CCTV coverage and level of technological sophistication varies greatly between the train stations. For instance, while some stations have a single pan/tilt/zoom camera, others have up to 30 cameras in operation. The majority of cameras are trained on entrances and exits, ticket machines, barrier gates, and Help Points. Sixty-five of the stations with cameras are linked up to two control centres (Wimbledon and Feltham) and sixty-six are what the Information and Security Manager describes as 'stand-alone' systems. The latter are recorded locally at the station but are not monitored by a dedicated member of staff.

The images from approximately 623 CCTV cameras are relayed back to two control centres, one at Wimbledon and one at Feltham (both control centres can access the images from CCTV cameras). At Wimbledon control centre, which opened in December 2002, the images are displayed on a bank of 33 monitors. It is a very spacious control room (approximately 50ft by 40ft) with brand new furniture and a computerised system for accessing images. At the back of the control room there is an elevated area where the Control Room Manager sits at a desk with two swivel chairs, two PC's and two telephones. Directly in front of the managers desk three people (a white male in his fifties, a white female in her fifties and a white female in her early forties) work at a 30ft long 'Information Desk'.

Beyond this is another long desk where the CCTV operators carry out their day-to-day tasks. This desk contains 12 PC's which are divided into three groups of four. Going from left to right, the first PC has a database containing information on journey details. The second PC displays the image from a CCTV camera that is trained on one of the train stations Help Points (where customers can speak to operatives in the control room on a two-way intercom system). The third PC is 'touch-screen' operated and contains maps of

all the train stations. The maps displayed on this PC have details of the station lay-out including the location of Help Points, camera positions etc. The fourth PC displays images from any camera that the CCTV operator wishes to pull down from any station. During my visit to the control room there were two CCTV operators on duty, both casually dressed Black females in their thirties. CCTV Operator I was responsible for operating the first set of four PC's, the second set of PC's were turned off, and CCTV Operator II was responsible for monitoring the third set of four PC's. Both operators were wearing headsets and were busy taking calls from customers. The majority of these calls, as the Control Centre Manager explained, were 'what time is my next train?'

The main aims of the system, according to the Information and Security Manager, are 'to reduce crime, to reassure the public, to deter anti-social behaviour, to protect SW Trains property from vandalism, and to increase passenger perceptions of safety and security'. The kind of behaviour that is not allowed on the trains or in the stations is documented in the Railway Byelaws that were implemented under Section 129 of the Railways Act 1993 and Section 67 of the Transport Act 1962. Forms of 'unacceptable behaviour' include the use of threatening language, disorderly behaviour, writing or painting on property, damaging property, spitting, and dropping litter (South West Trains, 2003: 7). Other forms of behaviour are only allowed with written permission from the operator, including singing or the use of an instrument for the production or reproduction of sound. Any person believed to be in breach of these laws will be asked to leave and if they refuse that 'may be removed from the railway by an authorised person using reasonable force' (South West Trains, 2003: 16).

In terms of crime and order related problems the Information and Security Manager (ISM) singled out 'graffiti' and 'begging' as particular problematic. To tackle the problem of 'Dutch Graffiti' (writing etched on to the train windows with a coin) the ISM says, 'at the moment I'm trying to convince the company that the introduction of CCTV on the trains themselves would provide a cost effective way of tackling this problem'. He says that the images from the cameras would not be relayed back to the control centre at Wimbledon and would therefore act mainly as a deterrent. He would like to see four cameras on each carriage. Meanwhile, in relation to the problem of begging he says:

'The other thing we're trying to do is use Anti Social Behaviour Orders. This is new territory, I don't know if you know anything about these. What happens is you need to get six or seven instances of nuisance, disorder or harassment and every time you see an instance of say "begging" you report it and then you take it to the CPS and they grant you an ASBO that says, "Keep away from that station"' (Information and Security Manager).

The system is also used for the purpose of crowd control during major sporting events. As the Control Centre Manager explained, 'when Twickenham is on we can get overcrowding and safety problems. You could have 2,000 people trying to get on the platform at once. So we liaise with the platform staff and get them to limit the number of people coming into the station or close the station'. There is also close liaison with the

police. This liaison includes both 'reactive' and 'proactive' use of the system by the police. As the Control Centre Manager points out, 'the police request video's all the time. I'd say we hand over about 150 tapes per month to the police to do with instances on the stations or near the stations'. In terms of proactive use of the system the manager says that police officers are often based in the control room for various exercises. 'At the moment', she says:

'We've got a problem with "ticket touts" and "aggressive beggars" at Surbiton. You can see we've got three cameras on there at the moment. The police ask us to monitor and pass on information, and we've had ASBO's [Anti Social Behaviour Orders] issued against known people' (Control Centre Manager).

Communication Links

In terms of communication links, the images from this public transport CCTV network can be relayed to Kingston Council's CCTV control room. Moreover, during the Royal Ascot horse race meeting held at the end of June CCTV operators at the Wimbledon control centre can access images from cameras set up by the British Transport Police. There is also a radio hand-set in the control room for two-way communication between CCTV operators and the staff at Wimbledon Train Station. The latter have a separate City Centre Radio Link which allows them to communicate with the retailers in Wimbledon town centre. As the ISM explains, 'basically, what happens is if someone steals something from Marks and Spencer's they can get on the radio and say, "we've had someone in our shop stealing and they're heading towards the train station, this is what they look like". The station staff at Wimbledon also carry pagers on their belts to alert them of any incident. Further communication via radio links allow operatives in the control room to communicate with guards on the trains and employees at Operations Control, Waterloo Station, as the Control Centre Manager explains:

'At 3.30pm we have "schools out", you know, Monday to Friday. Just general vandalism, graffiti, kids hassling passengers. We can either send a "message from God" [on the Customer Service Intercom] or deploy one of the Travel Safe Officer's. If it's a safety issue we can get in touch with Operations Control who are based in Raft at Waterloo. They can then contact the driver and say, "go slow there's kids on the track", or whatever. Each guard on the train has a mobile radio and can be contacted by Raft. Drivers also have radio links with the signal box but we usually try to avoid sending messages directly to the drivers you know'.

If a crime-related incident is detected the CCTV operator may deploy a Travel Safety Officer or a police officer. To deploy the latter the CCTV operator must telephone the MICC (Management Information Control Centre) near Scotland Yard. Following this the MICC gives the control centre a reference number and arrange the deployment. If there is no British Transport Police officer available they contact and deploy the police officers nearest to the station concerned. At the back of the control room there is a wall display that contains photographs of incidents that have led to an authoritative intervention.

These include the lighting of a fire in one train station, suicide attempts, and a protestor who handcuffed himself to the top of a train during the Longcross Arms Fair.

Communication with people outside of the control room is also possible via the 'Help Points' which are installed on many of the company's train station platforms. The Help Points have a green button for 'customer information' and a 'red button' for emergency. While the system is used mainly by rail travellers requesting information it also used for other purposes, as the Information and Security Manager explained:

'We get people pressing the help button saying, "I'm going to kill myself", [and] people make mistakes on it. Because the green light is for information and the red light is for emergency. But on the continent the colour for emergency is green, so we get a lot of people pressing it by mistake'.

The Information and Security Manager also plans to install a 'long line PA system' that will allow operatives in the control room to communicate with people in the station. As he says,

'There's safety issues, you know, kids putting things on the track or playing "chicken". One of the things we're hoping to do with the Customer Information System is introduce a long line PA system. With this we could send a message from control to the PA. "The voice of God", we call it, because the kids think they're all alone but then they'll hear this voice on the PA system, "stop what you're doing"'.

The Information and Security Manager sums up the strengths and weaknesses of the system by saying that CCTV is 'a fantastic deterrent against crime', but that 'you can't possibly monitor everything for 24 hours a day. To do this we'd need 65 operators in there'. Finally, in relation to the legality of the system, the system has signs indicating the presence of surveillance cameras but the company is currently 'in the process of changing them all to come in line with the Data Protection Act. What we need to do is put a contact number on so that people know who to contact if they want to access their data' (Information and Security Manager).

Organisation of work within the control rooms

The control room manager is a young (early to mid-twenties) Asian woman called Shakira. Shakira, who has a BA from the University of Warwick, has worked at the control centre for one year. Working with Shakira in the control centre at Wimbledon are 10 full-time employees and 5 part-timers who are all employed by South West Trains. During the day there are five members of staff on duty in the control room and one manager. At night time there is one CCTV operator on duty. The shifts run from around 06.30 to 14.30, 15.00 to 23.00 and 23.00 to 07.00. All the rosters are negotiated via the trade union. Many of the staff, the Information and Security Manager explains, are 'ex-railway people'. The training, he goes on to point out, is quite intensive and is mainly IT related. The training is carried out by a series of 'coaches'. These are full-time

employees with extensive knowledge of the system. There is an interview selection for the job and a Coaches Training Course.

In terms of the security officers based in the train stations, the Information and Security Manager stated that the company had previously used guards from a private security company 'but we found that they were poorly motivated'. Today the company employs 36 Travel Safe Officers. With these officers the company receives additional police resources which means that at present there are 36 Travel Safe Officers, 7 police officers, and a Travel Safe Co-ordinator who is also a police officer. The Travel Safe Officers are coordinated by the British Transport Police. Their main objectives are:

1. To provide help, support and reassurance to customers and staff on trains and at stations.
2. To discourage anti-social behaviour.
3. To be the eyes and the ears of the BTP.

All of the officers have received training in conflict management, knowledge of railway bye-laws, court procedures, citizens powers of arrest, diversity training, radio procedure, statement writing and customer service. As the Information and Security Manager explained, 'one day, you know, they'll be in plain clothes working with the police to tackle graffiti. The next day they'll be in uniform on the trains giving speeches to kids about how to behave. So they patrol the stations and they patrol the trains [and] what they do is they act as a witness. They enforce the law by being a witness to crimes taking place'.

2.3 West London Mall

Organisation of video surveillance

West London Mall is a 19th century listed building situated on a busy high street in West London. Formerly a department store, the shopping centre opened as a mall in 1989. The mall has four levels and 85 retail outlets. These include most of the major national men's and women's fashion stores, a wide range of international restaurants (e.g. Italian, French and a Sushi Bar), an 8-screen multiplex cinema, and a car park with 177 parking spaces and an 'auto valet' service. The mall recently received the Secured Car Parks Award from the Association of Chief Police Officers and the AA. The ground floor of the mall has an atrium at each of the main entrances and an elegant marble staircase that dominates the building. The Mall is situated on a very busy high-street containing mainly small boutiques, restaurants, coffee bars, and several national chain stores. The area includes a mix of hotels, tourist attractions and affluent housing areas, but is also a short walking distance from several large council estates. Thus, as the OM explained, the mall has a very mixed and cosmopolitan clientele. It is also a very busy mall, with twice as many visitors a year than St Paul's Cathedral.

The first CCTV system on this site was installed when the mall opened in 1989 and consisted of 17 cameras. This system was then up-graded in 1997 to thirty odd cameras. Today the mall has a brand new digital CCTV system that was installed just a few months ago consisting of 75 CCTV cameras (50 'pan/tilt/zoom' and 25 'fixed' cameras). According to the Duty Manager, the large number of internal cameras was necessary to cover the many 'blind spots' that were created by the enormous white pillars in the building. The majority of fixed cameras are located 'backstage' in the delivery areas, corridors, stairwells and other areas which are out of bounds to members of the public. There are also a number of external cameras mainly on the roof, some of which overlook residential areas. However, according to the Operations Manager, the security company that installed the new system are returning to the mall shortly to re-programme the system so that it has an automatic 'blocking facility' which will appear on the screen when the cameras pan across residential areas. The majority of internal cameras are small dome cameras which 'fit in with the aesthetics of the mall design' (Duty Manager). The internal cameras are positioned to monitor entrances, exits, escalators and the main malls. The security company who installed the system discussed the issue of camera positions with the Operations Manager and the front-line operatives.

The images from the 75 cameras are relayed back a central control room where the screens are monitored 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. The images from the system are recorded digitally with a one second time-lapse and are displayed on six monitors on the control desk. In front of the monitors is the control panel which has an automatic focus function. Just to the right of the monitors the images from 16 of the 75 cameras are displayed on the recording monitor. As the Senior Contracts Manager explained, the digital recording system works by 'motion recording' which means that it only records what's on the cameras when someone or something moves in front of them. He goes on to demonstrate how this works:

Extract from the fieldnotes: The Senior Contracts Manager clicks the mouse on a toolbar and several icons appear on the right-hand side of the screen along with a list of numbers displayed on a spreadsheet at the bottom of the screen. One of the icons is a small red calendar. The SCM clicks on the calendar and selects a date - 17th March 2003. Next he uses the scroll bar at the bottom of the screen to select a camera and time (1.05 am). He clicks on a box in the spreadsheet and the image captured by one of the internal dome cameras on the ground floor of the mall at 1.05am on the 17th March appears on the screen. The Operations Manager leans forward and says, 'look, the images from this camera were not recording because there was no one in the mall. But if you watch through the glass doors in the background you'll see that as each car passes [on the street outside of the mall] in view of the camera it triggers the recording mechanism'. The Duty Manager chips in by saying, 'the digital recording system also has a "bookmark" so that we can quickly access any particular image that we've stored on the digital database'.

The aims of the system, as stated in a Code of Practice, are 'crime prevention and the prosecution of offenders' (Operations Manager). Examples of the kinds of incidents that the security staff use the system to deal with include 'mobile phone thefts from the

restaurants', shopkeepers leaving rubbish in the corridors, and, more dramatically, an attempted suicide when 'a young girl jumped from level three of the mall' (Operations Manager). However, as both the Operations Manager and the CCTV operator on duty stated, one of the main problems on this site is 'groups of youths hanging around':

'The main problems encountered on the malls stem from groups of youths congregating and generally causing a nuisance. Being in a very multi-cultural area we tend to get our fair share of customer disputes as well. The use of the CCTV allows us to monitor activity within the malls and target persistent offenders accordingly. Should any-one be banned from the centre this information is relayed through the shifts so that all security officers on the malls are aware of who is and isn't banned. But what they've started doing is instead of coming in large groups (because we've got about 10 different entrances to this place on the different levels) they've started coming in twos or threes and then meeting up with their friends' (OM).

Extract from the fieldnotes:

MMc: What cameras do you use most often?

CCTV Operator: Well just before you came I was using this one (uses one the 'backstage' cameras to look at the back door of one of the shops) 'cause we get a lot rubbish left out there. I also use this one (zooms in on MacDonald's) 'cause we get a lot of kids hanging around outside there on a Saturday'.

MMc: What do you do when you've got large groups outside there?

CCTV Operator: 'We move them on or ask them to leave'.

In relation to the problem of youths congregating in the mall, the Duty Manager informed me that on occasions the security officers issue 'Banning Orders' which consists of a formal letter stating how long the person is barred from the centre. He goes on to say, 'when they're ban's up they'll come back and ask us if they can come back in and if we think they're gonna behave we let them back in' (Duty Manager).

In terms of communication links, there are a number of ways in which the CCTV operator can communicate with the outside world. To begin with there is a radio link with three different channels. Channel three is used by the CCTV operators to talk to maintenance workers, channel two is used to liaise with cleaning staff, and channel one provides a means of two-way communication with the security officers on the mall. Also on the radio link are fifteen stores within the mall and one major store on the high street. Moreover, some of the stores in the mall have their own CCTV systems linked to an on-site control room. As the Duty Manager explained, 'one of the national retailers has its own CCTV system and if they see someone shoplifting or whatever in their store they can contact our guards or CCTV operator and give them a description'. While the system is not integrated with a public CCTV network, the security officers can liaise with the police during incidents as the OM explained:

'Local beat officers in the area have a hand-set. So our CCTV operator can call the police station [on the landline telephone] and then the station officer can contact the beat officer

and he can then switch channels on his radio and communicate with our guards. We can't listen into the police radio though'.

The police also use the shopping mall's CCTV system proactively, as the Duty Manager explained:

'The police use the system a lot. There was a bank hold-up a few weeks ago and the police had a suspect who they had been told used the mall and so they sat in the control room to see if they could identify them'.

There are also two 'hotlines' which allow the CCTV operators to communicate with those who work on the shopping malls premises. Firstly, there is a 'tenant's hotline' which is used by shop workers in the mall's retail outlets to contact the control room in case of an emergency. Secondly, there is a 'cinema hotline' which is used by cinema staff working at the multi-screen complex on the Fourth Level of the mall. According to the Senior Contracts Manager, 'this phone is used mainly when they [staff at the cinema] have problems with young boys going into the cinema and then trying to open the back doors to let their friends in without paying. Sometimes we have to go and eject them from the cinema'.

The control room also has two panic alarms: one used by the CCTV operator in the control room to let those in the management suite know there is an emergency situation in the mall (fire, fight etc.), and another used by customers in both the men's and ladies toilets and by reception staff in the management suite to contact the CCTV operator in the case of an emergency. The majority of deployments involve CCTV operators deploying one of the shopping mall's security officers to the scene. Deployment practice involves the use of a 'coding system' to inform the security officers on the mall of the type of incident (e.g. code 2 is a 'fire', code 4 is a 'flood', and code 10 is a 'fight'). During a Code 10, the Operations Manager said,

'All and sundry will go down there because we don't know how big or how small it is. It might be just a minor incident in which case one security officer could sort it out himself or it might be more serious and we'd all be down there. But we've had knives pulled on these guys and we don't take chances with that. That's not to say we overkill it either. If you're reacting to an incident and there's a lot of commotion then you know you're in for something serious'.

As well as monitoring the CCTV system the front-line operatives have a wide range of tasks to perform including access control, fire alarm procedures, loud speaker announcements, and monitoring use of the car park. On the right hand side of the control desk, for example, there is an intercom system which allows the CCTV operator to communicate with anyone trying to access the management car park. They can also remotely operate a steel shutter which leads to the car park. There is also a direct line which allows fire fighters at the local fire station to call the operatives to check if any alarms from the mall are due to testing procedures. Next to this there is another

telephone which allows those (usually security officers) wishing to gain access to the control centre at night to contact the CCTV operator in the control room. The access point has a fixed, black and white camera over-looking the door. The image from this camera is displayed on a tiny (six inch) monitor just above the telephone so that the CCTV operator can identify the person requesting access. The security officers are also responsible for administering pagers to maintenance workers. The control room has six pagers and a small key pad which allows the CCTV operator to send messages to those working on the premises. When maintenance workers are on the roof, for example, the CCTV operator can use the key pad to send a message (e.g. 'evacuate the centre').

The security officers are also responsible for monitoring the use of the car park. There is a car park intercom system which allows customers to speak to the control room staff directly from the shopping malls 'pay stations'. There is also a computer screen which displays detailed information on the use of the shopping mall's car park. The screen has a number of icons on the right hand side representing the 'barrier points' and 'pay stations'. If there is any fault with the pay stations and barriers the icons on the screen change from green to red. The car park also has remote sensors which are linked with the computer. This allows the security officers to instantly see how many cars are in the car park at any one time, as well as details on the length of time each vehicle has spent in the car park. If any driver attempts to leave the car park without paying the message 'invalid daily ticket' appears on the screen to alert the security staff of non-payment. If anyone has failed to pay, or has a damaged ticket, they are led to the control room where there is a computerised system which allows the security officers to charge those who haven't paid.

Organisation of work within the control rooms

Security operations at West London Mall are dealt with by an international company that specialises in 'integrated services'. As the Operations Manager explained:

'We deal with security, cleaning, maintenance, and administration personnel work. The Centre Manager is therefore my client and I run the day to day operation of the centre on her behalf. So we basically offer a one stop shop policy. The Centre Manager now only has one point of contact (that being myself) on a daily basis'.

The Operations Manager works from his office in the Management Suite which contains a monitor and control panel so that he can access the images from all 75 CCTV cameras, including a camera which overlooks the CCTV operator in the control room. He says, 'with the monitor in my office I can check up on the security guards in the control room to make sure they're using the system properly and in line with the Data Protection Act'. The security team at the mall consists of 14 security officers who are employed by the same company as the Operations Manager. At the head of the team is the Operations Manager himself who has a Dip RSA. Then there are two Senior Contracts Managers, two Duty Managers and 10 security officers.

During my visit to the mall I met three members of the security team. A Senior Contracts Officer called Ken who is 'Black' (Caribbean) and in his late-forties, a Duty Manager called Harry who is also 'Black' (Caribbean) and in his thirties, and a CCTV operator called Hamed, an Asian man in his early-thirties. Between them these three officers have worked at the mall for 37 years. Three other security officers, the Operations Manager informed me, have also worked at the mall for around a decade. The security team on this site, therefore, are quite unusual in that half (six) of the security officers have worked at the mall for over a decade.

Most of the security officers work between eight and twelve hour shifts. During a typical shift there is one CCTV operator in the control room and four patrol guards on the mall. According to the Operations Manager, all of the staff are vetted and receive intensive training from two senior security officers:

,The training of all staff is very in-depth. Security personnel attend an induction course held on site which covers various procedures such as Health and Safety. I have Risk Assessments and safe systems of work for all procedures relating to security. They must read through these and sign that they have read and understood the content. Manual Handling is also included. They also receive training on Evacuation procedures, Basic fire extinguisher training, Data Protection Act, First Aid, Lift Release training, Bomb awareness, etc. I have two people on site who are fully certified and competent Trained Trainers and carry out the company inductions as required.'

3 Observation order of South London Shopping Mall

3.1 Introduction

In this observational study of South London Shopping Mall we are going to do five things. Firstly, we will provide a brief description of our methodological procedure. Secondly, we will provide some background information on the site and the organisation of video surveillance. Thirdly, we will look at the social construction of suspicion. In this section we examine who or what was targeted by the CCTV operators and why? Fourthly, we will look at the issue of 'organisational conflict' and explain how this impacts on the operation of the CCTV system. Finally, we will construct a 'typology' of security officers orientation to their job in an attempt to explain how particular individuals accept or reject organisational goals and the technological means of achieving those goals.

Methodology

Access to conduct observational research in the CCTV control room was negotiated by one of the researchers with two managers employed by the shopping mall - the Marketing Executive and the Building Services Manager. Following an interview with the Marketing Executive and a brief visit to the CCTV control room, informal enquiries were made as to the possibility of conducting more detailed observational research in the control room. Two weeks after the interview a forwarding letter explaining the nature of the research was sent to the building services manager who requested a list of dates stating when we intended to visit the control room. Observations were carried out by one of the researchers between 3 October 2002 and 3 December 2002. In total 120 hours of monitoring were observed - the equivalent of fifteen eight hour shifts between 9.00 am and 5.00 pm. All days of the week were covered except Sundays when the mall is not open for business. The researcher travelled from Hull to London the night before each period of observation, then, after conducting research in the control room for two shifts, he travelled back to Hull to write up the fieldnotes.

Only one CCTV operator monitored the system at any given time. During the 120 hours of observation all 10 of the security officers who worked the daytime shift were monitored as they sat at the control desk, although some of these officers worked in the control room for just an hour or so. During some periods of observation the researcher sat to the left of the CCTV operator so that he could see the TV monitors and talk to the CCTV operator on duty. However, on other occasions he chose to sit at a desk just behind the CCTV operator. This was because the main CCTV operator hardly ever used the system proactively. Thus it seemed inappropriate to sit close to the control desk watching the screens when the security officer was either reading a newspaper, using his

mobile phone, or just sitting (sometimes with eyes closed) back in his swivel chair relaxing.

The researcher only asked questions once it seemed that the CCTV operator had decided of his or her own volition that someone or something was worth monitoring. To ask questions as soon as the CCTV operator took an interest in someone or something on the screens might have encouraged them to pay more attention to the screens than they normally would have. A small notebook was used in the field when appropriate and full field notes, including full descriptions of any targeted surveillance were written up either immediately after they occurred or at the end of each shift. However, field notes on security officers' values and beliefs, work tensions, and interactions in the control room were usually written up outside of the control room. For instance, some were written up back in the hotel room, while others were recorded on the bus, tube and train on the researchers journey from London to Hull. These field notes were then typed-up and produced a total of 35,000 words.

The fieldnotes of targeted surveillances also formed the basis for filling in the quantitative observation schedule. This recorded four types of data: 'shift data', 'targeted suspicion data', 'person data', and 'deployment data'. In total this has produced data on the surprisingly low figure of 84 targeted surveillances. In 59 of these surveillances a person was identified and we have basic demographic data for each of them.²The names of all those who participated in the research have been changed to guarantee anonymity.

3.2 Organisation of video surveillance

South London Mall was built in the late 1960's and is situated in a town centre in South London. The Mall is only a short walk from some very affluent housing, but there are also pockets of extreme deprivation very close to the mall. For example, within the grounds of the shopping mall's service yard areas there are three high-rise council flats and one block of low-rise council flats. The 500 or so residents who live in these flats are the shopping mall's main clientele. At present, the mall is going through £70 million redevelopment programme. From my conversation with shopping mall's Marketing Executive, it would appear that one of the main outcomes of the redevelopment for the new proprietors will be to attract the more affluent consumers in the surrounding area. As the marketing executive explained:

,We've got around 500 residents in these blocks in total. We look at them as sort of our core catchment really in so much as they're the immediate catchment. But they're not really a sustainable catchment because they're fairly low income. So the types of shops we have here have to be fairly low budget. So you can't really say "yes, okay that's an affluent

² Some caution needs to be exercised when comparing these findings with previous studies as the number of 'targeted surveillances' is relatively low.

area that's gonna be spending huge amounts of money. If you actually look at the over all demographics of the Borough, on the east and west sides of the high street it's very affluent. You've got high percentages of A's, B's and C1's,³ the more affluent socio-economic groups, and you've got lower percentages of C2's, D's and E's - much lower than the national average. Whereas the A's, B's and C1's are about between five and eight per cent higher than the UK average ... What we tend to find from a marketing point of view where you have a mass of people that are primarily D-E spectrum and you have mass of people that are sort of A, B, C1, the D's and E's are quite territorial and what they try to do is because they are quite loud and quite aggressive they tend to sort of push out the A's and B's. Now unless the mass of A's and B's is large enough to sort of maintain their status, they tend to be sort of pushed out. So the area, although it is predominantly A, B, C1 (you might have a lower amount of D's and E's) because they're so loud and aggressive they tend to push out the A's and B's. So you end up with a nightmare situation, and it's only policeable by security and CCTV.'

As part of the redevelopment programme a new digital CCTV system consisting of 40 cameras is due to be installed in 2003 by Stallion Security. However, the system currently in operation looks pretty old and battered. The first cameras were installed in the 1980's and the system has been up-dated periodically with, for example, the introduction of dome cameras. During the period of observation several cameras were out of action due to the refurbishment taking place in the mall. However, there are fourteen cameras in total, eight internal cameras and six external cameras. The internal cameras are all colour and include a combination of pan/tilt/zoom and dome cameras. These are situated to monitor the malls, the entrance points and the lifts. The six external cameras are all black and white and include five pan/tilt/zoom and one fixed camera. The fixed camera is used to monitor the access point from the multi-storey car park. The other five external cameras are used to monitor the entrance points to the shopping malls five service yard areas. Each of the yard entrances has a two-way intercom system that allows the CCTV operators to communicate with drivers wishing to gain access to the service yard areas. The access points also have a gate that is operated remotely by the CCTV operators in the control room. During the period of observation the use of the cameras in conjunction with the intercom system at the access control points appeared to be the main function of the security system.

The control desk consists of six TV monitors. The top row of three monitors display images from the black and white cameras in the shopping mall's service yard areas. Below these there is another row of monitors. The first of these employs sequential switching to display the images from all the shopping mall's internal cameras. The second is what the security officers describe as the 'working monitor' which is used to monitor

³ Here the Marketing Executive is referring to the 'ABC1' scale of social stratification which classifies occupational groups as follows: Group A - Professional Workers (e.g. lawyers, doctors etc.); Group B - Shopkeepers, Farmers, Teachers, White-collar Workers; Group C1 - Skilled Manual Workers ('high grade'); Group C2 - Skilled Manual Workers ('low grade'); Group D - Semi-Skilled Manual Workers; Group E - Unskilled Manual Workers.

incidents in progress. The third displays the images from four cameras on a four-way split screen. Previously the CCTV control room also contained a TV monitor that allowed the security officers to relay pictures from the council's open-street CCTV system. When the researcher asked one of the CCTV operators why it had been removed he replied, 'some of the guards were being a bit naughty and miss-using the cameras so they took it down'. I ask him what he means by naughty and he replied, 'you know, watching things they were not supposed to be watching; girls walking down the street and things like that'.

The system is monitored 24 hours a day, 365 days a year and the images from all the cameras are recorded with a three-second time-lapse. Recording can be switched to 'real-time' but as one of the security officers explained, this 'takes about a minute to programme'. Videotapes are kept for thirty-one days and taped over twelve times. There is no code of practice for the CCTV system which means that the legal aspects in relation to operational procedures and aims of the system are not formally documented. However, the mall does have signage in accordance with the current Data Protection Act. According to one of the security Supervisors, the Act has also had an impact on operational procedures in relation to the distribution of images and unauthorised visits to the CCTV control room:

'Before it used to be really good because we used to be able to find someone we knew was a troublemaker take a photograph and put it on the wall. So if anyone new started within a week they know these people and could monitor them whenever they entered the centre. But now, due to the Data Protection we can't do it ... And in the past I've had a lady come up to me and say you know "I've had my bag stolen". And we could go up to the control room and we could look at the videotape and "oh yes there you are there's the one who nicked it". But now, they're not allowed to come to the control room to view it.'
(Security Supervisor).

Below the screens on the control desk there is a telephone, four intercom systems which allow the CCTV operator to remotely operate the access points, an intercom system to open the door to the management suite, and an 'Emergency Telephone' that is used by shops located in the mall to contact the control room. Next to the Emergency Telephone is the hands-free receiver for Shopping Mall Radio Link. This radio is used for two-way communication between the CCTV operator and the patrol guards. During more 'serious' incidents the CCTV operator uses the radio to send a 'code blue' message which means that all guards on duty are required to provide urgent assistance usually to some one who is being physically threatened. The control room also contains a receiver for the Retail Radio Link which allows two way communication between the CCTV operators, the police, the council's CCTV control room, and several retailers from businesses in Wandsworth Town Centre.

The security officers at South London Mall work for a UK private security company. On the day shift, there are ten security officers who work between 40 and 60-hour weeks.

Some of the officers work 12 hour shifts from 7.00 am to 7.00 pm, while others work during opening hours, i.e. 9.00 am till 5.00 pm. The rate of pay is £6.50 per hour. The uniform consists of grey trousers, black shoes, and navy blazer with gold buttons, white shirt and blue and red striped tie. There are two Supervisors and eight security officers who are all answerable to the Senior Contracts Manager who is also employed by Security Company. During the period of observation, all but two of the security officers were 'black' (i.e. African, Caribbean, or Black British) or Asian. Harry, the Senior Supervisor, thinks that this is a major problem because it means that 'only two of us can sit at the control desk 'cos the rest can't speak fluent English'.

At present, training procedures for new security guards appears to be a bit haphazard. From informal conversations with the security officers it would appear that only one or two of the officers are fully trained while others have either very little training or no training at all. Harry, the Senior Supervisor, has been given the task of training new officers; a task he doesn't particularly relish:

'I was asked to train some guys up you know. And I said, 'why do you wanna be in security?' And he said, 'I'm doing it for three months before I go back to college'. I asked another guy, 'why do you wanna be in security?' And he said, 'I just wanna pay some debts off'. Do you know what I mean? What's the point in training these guys if they're only gonna be here for three months? It cost a fortune to put people through proper training and it's not worth it.' (Harry)

3.3 The social construction of suspicion

Who was targeted?

There are some marked variations between the findings of the present study and previous observational studies of CCTV control rooms in relation to the social characteristics of people targeted by the operatives (we are comparing figures on the 'primary target' here rather than the 'group target'). As Table 3 shows, three-quarters of targeted surveillance were of males. This figure is considerably lower than the one reported in Norris and Armstrong's (1999: 109) observational study of three open-street CCTV systems which found that 93% of targeted surveillances were directed towards males. However, the figure is slightly higher than that found in McCahill's (2002: 108) observational study of two shopping malls which showed that 71% of targeted surveillances were of males.

Some of the main differences between the present study and previous research are in relation to the age group of those singled out for surveillance. For example, previous research has shown that the vast majority of people targeted by those responsible for operating CCTV systems are young. In their observational study of open-street CCTV, Norris and Armstrong (1999: 109) found that 85% of targeted surveillances were of those in their teens or twenties, while only 15% of those targeted were aged thirty or

over. Similarly, in his observational study of two shopping malls, McCahill (2002: 107) found that 88% of those targeted were in their teens or twenties. However, in the present study only 51% (30 out of 59) of targeted surveillances were directed towards people in their twenties or below, and the remaining 49% of those who were targeted were aged thirty or over.

Table 3: Characteristics of primary person under targeted surveillance

Characteristics	No.	%
Sex		
Male	44	75%
Female	15	25%
Total	59	100%
Age		
Child	7	12%
Teenager	5	8%
Twenties	18	30%
Thirties	10	17%
Middle-aged	18	30%
Elderly/frail	1	2%
Total	59	99%
Appearance		
Uniform	2	3%
Subcultural – ethnic	3	5%
Subcultural – fashion	13	22%
Casual	33	56%
Scruffy	8	14%
Total	59	100%
Ethnicity		
White	32	54%
Black	24	41%
Asian	3	5%
Total	59	100%

In terms of appearance, over half (56%) of those who were 'surveilled' were casually dressed. In relation to previous research on shopping malls the main differences appear to be in the targeting of those who fitted the categories 'subcultural fashion' and 'scruffy'. For example, in McCahill's (2002) observational study of two shopping malls, 70% of targeted surveillances were directed towards those who were either 'subcultural' or 'scruffy' in appearance, whereas only 36% of the targeted surveillances in the present study were directed towards these two groups. Thus, while previous research has shown

that CCTV operators mainly target young working class males (Norris and Armstrong, 1999; McCahill, 2002), the security officers on this site are more concerned with the 'problem families' that live in the flats that are built on the grounds of the shopping mall:

'Most of the problems we get on the mall are caused by the same people every time. We use the CCTV system to monitor. As soon as we see someone on the mall we know they're gonna cause problems so we just monitor them ... We had somebody yesterday and the police turned up and we gave them a name and they went, "oh yes, we know him". I mean there's a group of about thirty; if you got rid of thirty people in Wandsworth there'd be no crime.' (Senior Supervisor)

'The 10 per cent of people who are aggressive on the mall are the people who live in the blocks. The same families.' (Marketing Executive)

Some of the guards had a very negative image of the shopping mall's main clientele, as the following extracts from the field notes illustrate:

Extract from the field notes: Harry takes a big bundle of photographs out of one of the filing cabinets and we (Harry, Tarrik and I) look through the 'snaps'. The photographs are of 'known troublecausers' and most of them have something scribbled on them in felt tip: 'drugs', 'shoplifter', 'troublecauser', 'school tramps - kick them out', 'most beautiful woman in the world' (photograph of a plain looking woman), 'ring leader'. Tarrik says, 'the majority of thieves are black man. Eighty per cent of shoplifters are black ... Tarrik then passes me a photograph of a white female in her early twenties: 'you should see her now man. Her teeth are black, she stinks, and she's got boils on her face from HIV. These people are disgusting man. They drop coins on us or eggs from the flats' ... Tarrik comes across a photograph of an elderly black woman with the following words written on it: 'Woman who fouled on south mall - banned'. 'She had a dump on the south mall', Tarrik explains. 'Black people will piss and shit anywhere, man', Harry replies. Tarrik says, 'there's a mental hospital just down the road man and we get them all in here'.

Targeted Surveillance 5 (Shift 7: 13.17-13.17)

At 13.17 a patrol guard contacts Harry in the control room to inform him that 'Tracey is just leaving by the South Mall'. Harry finds Tracey on camera. She is dressed in jeans and stonewash denim coat and is pushing two small children in a twin buggy. Tarrik, who is standing to the left of the control desk looking over Harry's shoulder, says, 'look at her, she's disgusting. I bet she no longer washes her fanny. I bet there's sea urchins down there'. Tarrik continues, 'killing these people would be a (pauses to think of the right word) ... 'pleasure', says Harry finishing Tarrik's sentence.

Finally, we found that 54% of people targeted by the system operators were 'white', 41% were 'black' (i.e. African, Jamaican or Black British), and 5% were Asian. Whether or not this tells us anything about disproportionate targeting of specific ethnic groups is difficult to say. In 1998, 20% of people in Wandsworth belonged to an ethnic minority group, which seems to imply that they are twice as likely to be targeted by CCTV operators than you would expect from their number in the population. However, based on our own first-hand observation of the mall it would appear that ethnic minorities made up about 50% of those who frequented the mall. It is interesting to note that the only derogatory comments (including derogatory comments on ethnic background) on

the 'surveilled' recorded during the period of research came from the two white guards and one Asian guard quoted above (Harry, Tim and Tarrik). In contrast, comments on the 'surveilled' that came from the remaining ('Black') security officers often expressed a degree of sympathy with those who visited the mall:

Extract from the fieldnotes: During a targeted surveillance of an Afro-Caribbean male in his early-twenties (a 'known shoplifter') Darren says to himself, 'this Nicky Green needs a job man. He's gonna spoil himself you know. If he had a job he'd be a nuisance to no one'.

Extract from the fieldnotes: Misha is the only female security officer at the shopping mall. Born in Morocco she speaks in broken English and has lived in the local flats for eight years. I ask her about her experiences on the mall and she says, 'If you treat the people here with respect then they'll respect you. I live on the estate you know, so they know me and they respect me'.

Why were people targeted?

Following Norris and Armstrong (1999), the researchers assigned individuals or groups to categories if the operator had explicit grounds for their suspicion. This was regardless of whether or not the person under suspicion was actually involved in any criminal behaviour. For instance, if the operator tracked a known 'shoplifter' this would be treated as shop theft even though the individual may have been shopping rather than shoplifting.

Table 4: Reason for targeted surveillance

Reason	No.	%
Crime/Order	48	64%
Property management	11	15%
No obvious reason	10	13%
Person in need of help	6	8%
Total	75	100%

We can see from Table 4 that Crime and Order-related suspicion account for 64% of targeted surveillances. Within this category, the largest single category of suspicion was theft from store which accounted for 56% of targeted surveillances. The property management-related surveillances consisted mainly of unauthorised parking in the shopping mall service yards, while the person in need of help category includes lost children and people needing medical assistance.

Table 5: Type of suspicion

Type of suspicion	No.	%
Categorical	5	6%
Locational	4	5%
Personalised	5	6%
Transmitted	55	66%
Behavioural	15	18%
Total	84	101%

* Percentages may not add up to 100 due to rounding

In relation to the type of suspicion, we can see from Table 5 that two-thirds (66%) of targeted surveillances were initiated from outside the system. These figures reflect the extremely low level of proactive use of the system by CCTV operators. The vast majority of 'transmitted' suspicions concerned 'known troublecausers' and 'shoplifters' who had been identified by security officers whilst patrolling the mall. The following examples are fairly typical:

Targeted Surveillance 2 (Shift 7: 12.28-12.31)

At 12.28 Winston, who is patrolling the mall, contacts Harry in the control room:

Romeo 7: 'Romeo 7 to control over'.

Harry: 'Yes received over'.

Romeo 7: 'Yes you've got Charlie Smith outside of Boots over'.

Harry quickly finds Charlie Smith on camera. Charlie Smith is a white male in his mid to late-forties. He is scruffy in appearance and is accompanied by a white male in his thirties who is also scruffily dressed and is carrying a can of lager. Harry tracks the suspects through the mall.

Targeted Surveillance 4 (Shift 8: 15.44-15.51)

At 15.44 Misha uses her radio to contact Harry in the control room:

Misha: 'Romeo seven to control over'.

Harry: 'Yes received over'.

Misha: 'There's an IC1 male shoplifter in *Basic Clothes*; I think he's gonna try something. It's Charlie Smith over'.

Harry: 'Yes, I can see him on camera. Let him nick something and we can ban him again'.

Harry zooms in and sees Misha and Darren approach the suspect. Charlie Smith is a casually dressed (although on previous occasions he has looked scruffy) white male in his forties who has been targeted on several occasions during previous shifts. He is wearing a pair of black glasses, jeans and a black jacket. As Harry watches the screen he turns to me and says, 'Darren hates him you know. He used to be a right handful in the past'. We both watch as Charlie Smith points at Darren. 'I'll have you', says Harry impersonating Charlie. Charlie Smith walks away, turning around occasionally to say something to Darren. Harry switches cameras and loses Charlie Smith for a few seconds. 'Come on Charlie where are you?' he says. When Harry finds him he zooms in close and says, 'look at his face'. Charlie has an extremely painful looking black eye. He stands by the doors for a moment staring outside where it is raining heavily and then leaves the centre.

Mobilising a response

As Table 6 shows, 22 out of 84 (26%) of the targeted surveillance resulted in someone being deployed to the scene to deal with the incident. When someone was deployed it was most likely to be a private security officer employed by the shopping mall. We have information concerning the 'on-street' resolution in 21 of the 22 deployments. We found that nine deployments resulted in one or more persons being arrested or ejected from the mall. Of these nine incidents where someone was arrested or ejected, seven were related to 'theft from store'.

Table 6: Deployment and outcomes

	No.	%
Did this result in a deployment?		
Yes	22	26%
No	62	74%
Total	84	100%
Who was deployed?		
Private/shop security	19	86%
Police	1	5%
Emergency services	2	9%
Total	22	99%
On-street resolution?		
Target(s) let go	12	57%
Target(s) ejected	8	38%
Target(s) arrested	1	5%
Total	21	100%
How many arrested/ejected?		
One person	6	67%
Two people	3	33%
Total	9	100%
What was arrest/ejection for?		
Theft from store	7	78%
Unruly/disorderly	2	22%
Total	9	100%

Most of the ejections involved what the security officers described as 'known troublecausers':

Targeted Surveillance 6 (Shift 1: 12.28-12.29)

At 12.28 Sam is sitting at the control desk when he receives a message from Harry on the Shopping Mall Radio Link.

Harry: 'Romeo One to control'.

Sam: 'Yes, come in'.

Harry: 'Yes, I'm ejecting Charlie Smith, over'.

Sam uses one of the dome cameras to watch Charlie Smith, an elderly homeless man, being escorted from the centre by Harry.

Charlie Smith was an elderly homeless man who, according to the security officers, sleeps rough in one of the shopping mall's service yard areas. During the researchers spell in the control room, Charlie Smith was ejected from the mall on numerous occasions. When I asked Darren if Charlie was banned from the mall and he said, 'if he is looking really scruffy or he's drunk, then we throw him out of the centre'. Other suspects, however, received an official 'Banning Order':

Targeted Surveillance 2 (Shift 10: 14.08-14.30)

At 14.08 Harry is sitting at the control desk when he receives a call on the Emergency Telephone. The call is from someone who works in Iceland Frozen Foods and they inform Harry that there is a shoplifter in their store. 'Is he in the process?' Harry asks. 'What's he look like?' Then, on the hands-free receiver, Harry says: 'Control to Romeo 2 over. Come in Romeo 2'.

Harry turns to me and says: 'did he take his radio?'

Harry (back on the radio): 'Control to Romeo 7 come in'.

Misha: 'I'm in the car park'.

Harry: 'Control to Romeo 5'.

Romeo 5 (Winston): 'Yes, I'll deal with it'.

Harry fixes one camera on the entrance to Iceland and at the same time uses an internal dome camera to zoom in and look inside the shop.

Harry: 'Romeo 2 (Darren) come in. What's happened over?'

Darren appears in the control room: 'you remember that little one used to hang around with Charlie Smith? He's stolen a bottle of cider. You'll see him when he comes out'.

Darren searches the filing cabinet for a Banning Form. It reads as follows:

Banning Order Form
Our Reference: XXX666
Banning Order Number:
Dear...
Ejection (Banning) Order – South London Mall
Please take note that you are no longer a welcome visitor to South London Mall. The centre is private property and as such if you enter the centre again for any reason you will be trespassing and the police will be called to remove you. Further action may be taken against you by the police in connection with your trespassing. The ban is effective immediately.
Name:
Address:

Darren then heads back down to the mall. I ask Harry about the banning procedure and he says, 'we used to give them out all the time but now we can't because of the Data

Protection Act. As long as our doors are open you can come in. But if Iceland has banned him and he shoplifts again they can do him for burglary which is a higher charge'.

Darren contacts Harry on the radio: 'his name's John. He's leaving now'. Harry tracks the suspect on camera as he is led out by one of the new guards. The suspect is a scruffy, white male in his early thirties. He is wearing jeans, a blue parka with fur around the collar, and a blue baseball cap. When Harry sees him he says, 'I kicked him out about half an hour ago for being drunk. Wait till I see Misha. She said, "don't kick him out he's not causing any trouble"'. Harry watches and gets frustrated as the suspect stops to talk to the new guard and Misha. 'Just get him out', he says. The suspect walks back towards the central mall with Misha. 'This new guys useless', Harry says. 'Look at this guy. How can you leave a woman to deal with it? He can't speak English and he's working on a permit'.

Organisational conflict and its impact on operational procedures

As we have already seen, in 120 hours of observation in the CCTV control room at this site we witnessed just 84 targeted surveillances. In trying to understand the relatively low level of targeted surveillances it is necessary to explore the organisational environment in which it occurs. In this particular mall the most important determinant of surveillance practice was the level of conflict within the organisation. Conflict between the security officers and the management, for example, was intense. During my brief spell in the control room one guard was dismissed, two were demoted (moved from the mall to service yard duty), two received written warnings, and there were several disputes over pay, all of which generated a hostile atmosphere in the control room. The general mood amongst the officers is summed up in the following statements:

Extract from fieldnotes: This place is a joke. The new security manager is an old tramp who doesn't know what he's doing. He'll be drunk by this afternoon. He's an alcoholic and he thinks no one knows about it. Health and safety is a joke. No one knows what they're doing. I've worked in the biggest and the best shopping malls and I've worked in the biggest shit holes, and this one is just the worst. Those fire alarms are switched off. He's (Ned) asked me to train up the new guards on Health and Safety and I've just been going through the company documents and they're all out of date. The guy who wrote this up (Health and Safety manual) has based on it on another mall and it doesn't apply to this one. They only use [this security firm] because it's cheap. Only five out of twenty staff here have had any kind of training. There was no manager on duty today (Saturday) until 10.45 and if a fire went off there would have been nobody here to deal with it.

Extract from fieldnotes: This company is shit man. They don't care about us, they don't do anything for us. I've done so much for this company. They've rang me at twelve at night and asked me if I could work and I've said, 'yes, no problem'. And the staff here don't give a shit. They're all lethargic and lazy; they're not on the ball. We (Tarrik and Harry) used to come in here on our night off and help out the night staff. I came in here the other night because I'd left something in my locker and X was asleep down there, Y was asleep over there, and Z was brining his TV upstairs. And none of these guys are trained. They don't give a fuck. I've done my Sito, Health and Safety, Fire Procedures, People Management, the lot man. When the old security manager was here it was really good, you know. He put me through all the proper training courses. But Stephen hasn't got a fucking clue.

Disputes over pay served only to exacerbate the tension and organisational conflict:

Extract from fieldnotes: At 09.30, a night shift worker called Najin (a man in his late thirties from India) enters the control room and begins a conversation with Tim. Najin has arrived for a meeting with Stephen (Senior Contracts Manager) to discuss a couple of issues. The first issue involves Najin's pay. He tells Tim that since he has worked at the mall he has been on £6.00 an hour while everyone else is on £6.50 an hour. Tim says, 'it's a clear case of racial discrimination mate. Don't stand for it Najin. What's the Bob Marley song? "Get Up Stand Up". Don't accept it'.

Extract from fieldnotes: Tarrik arrives in the control room and seems very subdued, probably because of his recent arrest. But he also has other things on his mind. He thinks his wages are one hundred pounds short and is not very happy about it: 'I fucking hate this place man. This place is going straight to hell'. Tarrik leaves the control room briefly and while he's gone Stephen (Senior Contracts Manager) enters and Tim says, 'Stephen if I were you I'd sort Tarrik's wages out as quickly as possible. He is not happy and he's gonna blow'.

The disillusionment amongst the guards was reflected in their use, or rather non-use, of the CCTV system. During shift one, for example, Harry was using the joystick to patrol the mall. He zoomed in on Boots the Chemist and told me that it was usually a good idea to monitor those shops selling sandwiches across dinnertime. Next, he saw what he described as a 'known shoplifter' but didn't bother following him. On another occasion he saw a man leaving the mall with stolen books but didn't bother to deploy a security officer because he thought there was not enough staff on duty. On another occasion he tried to contact a guard but on receiving a muffled and incomprehensible response in broken English threw down his radio in disgust. During another incident Harry tried frantically to deploy one of guards to a shop that had been burgled at the back entrance. However, after making six or seven attempts to contact a security officer Harry got so fed up that he decided to deploy himself to the scene. When he returned to the control room he said:

I arrived down there and because I haven't had a chance to speak to the shop owner I haven't got a clue about what's going on. There's this big black guy down there and he's going, 'yes, do you want some?' And the shopkeepers are going mad, they're going 'where were security, where were security?' And I'm like, 'I don't have to explain myself. I was in control (the control room), I tried to deploy guards'. You know, but it's a joke. I've got one in the bookies, one down there, one doesn't give a fuck because he's just been demoted. You know what I mean? Even the cleaners are showing us up man. They were there before us. Down there you had the Town Centre Manager, the crime prevention people, the managers of five stores because the message went out on the 'Crime Shop' (retail radio link), two security guards from Basic Clothes, one security guard from the shop next door, the cleaners and then us. I told the shop owners, I said, 'look if you're not happy why don't you get together and go and see and Ned (building services manager) and tell him?'

Organisational conflict also existed between the security officers and the police. Some security officers, for example, had 'out-of-work' problems with the police. During one

shift Graham was very annoyed about the treatment he received after a minor car accident:

Extract from field notes: When the police arrived they checked my car very thoroughly man. They looked at the foot pedals and tyres but never bothered to check the other vehicle. They asked me to perform a breathalyser test and started to ask me stupid questions. They said "how long have you lived in this country?" So I said, "how long have you been in this job?" But they said nothing to the other guy. Then they said, "what year were you born?" So I told them and they said "so how old are you?" So I said, "didn't you go to school? Don't you know mathematics? Stop asking me stupid questions" And then I said, "go on arrest me; put handcuffs on me".

Other security officers had experienced 'on-the-job' trouble with local police officers. Tensions between the security team and the police came to a head when Tarrik was arrested for assaulting a police officer. One Saturday afternoon, a fight broke out on the mall. A man had stolen a mobile phone; it turns out from his girlfriend. When confronted by several guards the man began to lash out. In the ensuing melee the suspect managed to head butt Graham (security guard) and land a right hook on Tarrik's chin. Following this Tarrik grabbed hold of the man and repeatedly smashed his face down on his knee. When describing the incident in the control room Tarrik told me that he took great care to ensure that the mans face was landing right on the end of his knee cap, rather than on the softer area just above the knee. There are conflicting views about what happened next. Harry says that during the fight a police officer from the Crime Prevention Shop in the mall tried to intervene and as Tarrik pulled his arm back to lay another punch, his elbow hit the police officer in the mouth and knocked out a couple of his teeth. Following this the police officer stood back and shouted 'ASSAULT!' 'So the man on the mall who had assaulted three guards, Harry says, 'walked off and the police came and arrested Tarrik'.

Following Tarrik's arrest the security team removed a radio hand-set (which allowed the police to listen to the security officers on the shopping mall radio link) from the Crime Prevention Shop to stop them from 'interfering' during incidents that take place on the mall. Tensions between the security team and the police were also having an impact on operational procedures, as the following incident illustrates:

Targeted Surveillance 1 (Shift 6 at 12.00-not identified)

At 12.00 Darren (the main CCTV operator on duty today) has gone for a break and Harry and Tarrik are sitting at the control desk. They receive a message on the shopping mall radio link from the 'Crime Shop' (police): 'Control we've just had a radio message from WH Smiths that two IC 3 males have been acting suspiciously in their shop. One of them is wearing jeans and a black baseball cap...' Harry interrupts before hearing the end of the message: 'WH Smiths have got their own security', and then, on the radio says, 'yes, received Crime Shop'. No attempt is made to find the suspects on camera.

During another incident Harry spotted a suspect on camera placing a knife up his sleeve. When the police used their radio to ask Misha (female security officer) if she was okay,

Harry, on the radio, said, 'Yea, Crime Prevention can you keep out of this please?' When they continued to interject on the radio Harry snapped, 'Crime Prevention can you shut up?'

Operational procedures on this site were also shaped by the level of managerial supervision. The shopping mall management consisted of a Building Services Manager and a Marketing Executive both of whom are employed by the owners of the mall. Neither of these managers was involved in the day-to-day management of the security system, choosing instead to leave operational decisions and management of the security officers to Stephen (the Senior Contracts Officer) who is employed by the contracted private security company. However, as the following extracts from the fieldnotes illustrate, Stephen has failed to gain the respect of many of the guards:

Extract from fieldnotes: It's 9.00am on a Monday morning and Tim, Harry and Tarrik are in the control room. Stephen enters and says to Harry, 'can I have the keys for F Yard please Harry?' 'No', Harry replies in a pretend stern voice. Stephen laughs nervously and walks away with the key. Both Tim and Harry waft the air with their hands to remove the smell of alcohol left by Stephens' breath. 'What year was that?' Harry asks Tim. 'Bells 1974', Tim replies.

Extract from fieldnotes: Stephen informs Harry that he's going 'walk about'. When Stephen leaves Harry turns to me and says, 'he's going to the pub. He'll be back in a couple of hours and he'll be pissed out of his head. I was in the control room the other day and I heard this loud bang in the management office upstairs. I went up to the office and I saw Stephen rushing to his feet and he told he'd dropped something. But he hadn't he was pissed and he'd fallen over'.

Extract from fieldnotes: Stephen appeared to be a bit more authoritative and assertive during this shift, although on occasions having asserted his authority he quickly conceded when given an excuse. During one visit to the control room, for example, he said to Darren: 'Darren, what's the radio doing on?' 'I'm waiting for news on the sniper' (someone had been arrested in relation to the killings in Washington), Darren replied. 'Okay', said Stephen. On another occasion, Stephen told Darren he wanted everyone to sign for radios when they reported for duty. Darren said okay, but duly ignored Stephens request.

Because there was very little managerial supervision of how the system was used on a day-to-day basis, operational procedures were left almost entirely in the hands of the security officers. However, there were different perceptions amongst the security officers about what constituted a 'serious' incident and about how to respond to various incidents:

Targeted Surveillance 3 (Shift 4 at 10.18 – not identified)

At 10.18 Winston calls Tim in the control room:

Romeo 4: Control there's a group of IC 1 males causing trouble on the South Mall'.

Tim: 'Yes, what they actually doing Romeo four, are they just messing about?'

Romeo 4: 'Actually, it's a... it's a lot more than that control. They're throwing stuff around and it's getting out of control, control over'.

Tim: 'Okay, I'll keep the cameras on them'.

Romeo 4 to Misha (patrol guard on the mall): 'Romeo 5 can you keep those kids out?'
 Misha: 'Romeo 4, I spoke to them earlier they're just kids, they're okay'.

Targeted Surveillance 3 (Shift 11 at 15.00 – not identified) – different perceptions

At 15.00 Darren is sitting at the control desk when he receives a message from Harry:
 Harry: 'Romeo one to control. Can you call whiskey whiskey (Wandsworth Police)? I've got a mad man on South Mall completely drunk. He's just left by the South Mall and he's taking on cars now'.
 Off the radio Darren says, 'I'm not calling the police for some drunk guy man'.
 Harry: 'Romeo three come in'.
 Romeo 3 (sounding a little hysterical): 'Yes, I'm on my way ASAP'. Darren laughs.
 Harry: 'Romeo three what did you say?'
 Romeo 3 (Winston): 'Yes, I'm on my way'.
 Harry: 'Control, did you call whiskey whiskey over?'
 Darren: 'That's a negative over. What's this guy doing over?'
 Harry: 'It's okay. I'll call them myself over'.
 Off the radio Darren says, 'what are you doing out there man?'
 A couple of minutes later Harry contacts Darren: 'Control. Disregard that man over'.
 'Waste of police time man', Darren says to himself.
 When Harry returned to the control room an hour or so later he told me what had happened in the incident above. Harry was walking down the South Mall when a man threatened him. Harry tried to ignore the man but he took his jacket and shirt off and shouted at Harry, 'I'm gonna have you'. Harry goes on to tell me that once he had led the man out of the South Mall he started jumping up and down in the middle of the road and was stopping traffic. It was then that he decided to call the police.

In the first of the two incidents above Winston contacts the control room because he is concerned about the behaviour of a group of boys. However, neither Tim (CCTV operator in the control room) nor Misha (patrol guard on the mall) take Winston's concern seriously. Winston, as we shall see later, spent a lot of his time in the local bookmakers when he was supposed to be patrolling the mall. Moreover, when he was patrolling the mall there was a perception amongst the guards that he was never around when trouble commenced. When Winston sent messages to the control room, therefore, his colleagues often questioned his judgement as to the seriousness of the unfolding incident. Meanwhile, in the second incident above Darren ignored Harry's request for police assistance to deal with a potentially violent customer. As far as Darren was concerned, the person had left the mall which meant that he was 'out of our jurisdiction'. Harry, on the other hand, wanted to pursue the assailant who had questioned his authority. The reason for these conflicting views on how to respond this incident will become much clearer in the following section when we look in more detail at the orientation of the security officers to their job.

Orientation of security officers to the job

As we have seen, due to the weak management structure on this site operational procedures were left entirely in the hands of the security officers. What we want to do now is look in a bit more detail at how individual officers responded to this situation. In

table six we have adapted Robert Merton's (1938) famous typology in an attempt to examine the orientation of different security officers to their job.

Table 7: A typology of operators/security officers

	Organisational goals	Techno means
Techno-work embracer (conformist)	+	+
Techno-work avoider (drop out)	-	-
Work-embracer (innovator)	+	-
Work-avoider (ritualist)	-	+

1. The 'techno-work embracer' accepts both the organisational goals and the technological means of achieving those goals.
2. The 'techno-work avoider' rejects both the organisational goals and the technological means of achieving them.
3. The 'work embracer' is committed to the organisational goals but rejects the technological means of achieving them.
4. The 'work avoider' rejects the organisational goals but accepts the technological means of achieving them (or has a level of technological sophistication required to achieve the organisational goals if he or she wished to pursue them).

The techno-work embracer

Harry is 24-year-old white male who has worked at the shopping mall for around four years. Harry, who was formerly employed as the Security Manager of the shopping mall, is the most experienced and knowledgeable of all the security officers. In terms of technological sophistication, Harry is easily the most experienced guard. He is very quick and efficient when using the control panel and knows how to programme the cameras, change default positions, take hard copy print outs etc. In terms of organisational goals, Harry is basically a 'crime fighter'. He constructs theories about crime and puts these theories into practice when using the CCTV system. For instance, he uses the CCTV system to watch shop owners that he suspects are receiving stolen goods and the 'body language' of potential shoplifters. He also watches particular shops at specific times because he suspects they might be vulnerable to shoplifters:

Targeted Surveillance 2 (Shift 3: 11.45-11.46)

At 11.45 Harry is in the control room and is using one of the internal dome cameras to zoom in the doorway of Basic Clothes (clothes shop). He sees a white male in his early forties looking at three-quarter length suede coats. As Harry watches the man trying on one of the coats he says, 'this time of year everyone nicks coats 'cos they're expensive you know'.

Targeted Surveillance (less than 30 seconds and suspect not identified)

Harry zooms in on Boots the Chemist and tells me that it was usually a good idea to monitor those shops selling sandwiches across dinnertime.

Harry was the only security officer who managed to spot offences in progress on the CCTV system including a man trying to put a book in his inside jacket pocket, a teenager putting a knife up his sleeve, and two boys stealing what he thought were DVD's:

Targeted Surveillance 3 (Shift 1: 10.01-10.04)

At 10.01 Harry is using a dome camera to survey the mall when he spots two young boys aged ten or eleven acting suspiciously by a stairwell in the shopping mall. The two boys are dressed in tracksuits and coats with the hoods up. Harry sees one of the boys trying to stuff something in his inside coat pocket and zooms in for a closer look. 'They've nicked some DVD's', Harry says. Harry calls a patrol guard to the scene: 'Romeo One, can you make your way to the stair case outside of X shop, there's two IC 1 males down there who've nicked some DVD's'. He then tracks the two suspects and says to himself, 'they're gonna leg it as soon as they see a guard'. Tarrik arrives on the scene and Harry asks him to bring the boys to the control room. Harry leaves the control desk and goes to meet Tarrik at the top of the stairs that lead to the control room. Tarrik and Harry then interrogate the two boys in the corridor between the managers' office and the CCTV control room.

The techno-work avoider

The techno-work avoider is epitomised by Winston. Winston is a Jamaican in his early forties. He spends a lot of the day in the local bookmakers rather than patrolling the mall and when on the rare occasion he does come to the control room he lacks the technological sophistication required to use the system effectively:

Targeted Surveillance 4 (Shift 11 at 16.18 – not identified)

At 16.18 Winston is sitting at the control desk when the telephone rings:

Winston (on the telephone): 'Hello, Wandsworth Shopping Centre. How can I help you? Erm, he's er, he's er, not in er at the moment. Okay, no problem. Er, what I'll do...' (while Winston is talking on the telephone he receives a message on the radio from one of the patrol guards).

Romeo 17: 'Romeo 17 to control over'.

Winston (on the telephone): 'Can you er hold the line please?' And then, on the hands-free receiver, Winston says, 'Stand by control (Winston is in the control room). Sorry, stand by Romeo seventeen'.

Winston (on the telephone): 'I'll get him to call you back okay?'

Winston (on the hands-free receiver): 'Come in seventeen'.

Romeo 17: 'Control a small girl has been mugged. She has had her mobile stolen outside the 'Snoozestore' over'.

The telephone rings again and a buzzer for one of the five intercom phones goes off. Winston picks up the intercom receiver for the F Service Yard area: 'Hello security'. There is no reply because Winston has picked up the wrong receiver. He tries again on the receiver for E Service Yard: 'hello security. Okay', he says, as he reaches for the button to open the gate for E Service Yard.

In the incident above Winston stammers on the telephone, grabs the wrong intercom receiver, and on the hands-free receiver says, 'stand by control' when he was addressing

a guard on the mall. Winston is rarely on the mall when needed and when he comes to the control room operational procedures quickly descend into chaos.

The work embracer

Misha is the only female security officer at the shopping mall. Born in Morocco she speaks in broken English and has lived in the local flats for eight years. Misha has previously worked as a security officer for two national retail stores on Oxford Street. During one very brief stint at the control desk she told me that the security system at one of these stores was excellent and that I should have carried out my study there instead of the 'rubbish system' at Wandsworth. I ask her about her experiences on the mall and she says, 'If you treat the people here with respect then they'll respect you. I live on the estate you know, so they know me and they respect me'. Misha, unlike most of the guards, takes her job very seriously and is very conscientious. The other guards often rib her because of this. Graham, for example, describes her as 'fussy'. On one occasion Misha was due to finish at four o'clock. She arrived in the control room at five to four to collect some things but refused to leave until the clock struck four. Winston, who was sitting at the control desk, said 'leave now Misha, don't be a chicken'.

While Misha was very committed to her job, she hated working in the CCTV control room. As she explained, 'people don't understand me (on the telephone and intercom) so they always ask me to repeat things. And they take advantage because I'm a foreigner'. Misha's dislike of working in the control room was so intense that on one occasion when called to the control room she stood at the doorway and refused to enter:

At 15.00 Graham calls Misha to the control room. When Misha arrives she finds that Graham has sneaked out to an area at the back of the control room to make a telephone call on his mobile phone. 'I'm not staying in here', Misha shouts to Graham as she stands at the entrance to the control room refusing to sit at the desk. As I sit in the control room on my own several requests for access to the service yard areas are made via the intercom systems. Misha walks into the control room, presses one of the buttons to raise the access control barriers and then walks out and resumes her position by the entrance to the control room. As Misha enters once again to answer the telephone, Graham returns but quickly leaves again when he receives another call on his mobile telephone. As Graham heads towards the control room exit, Misha grabs her things and sprints out of the control room. As she runs for the door she shouts to Graham, 'don't you leave me in here'.

The work avoider

Darren is the security teams second Supervisor. He is in his mid-forties, married with four children, and speaks in a thick Jamaican accent. Having worked at the mall for around ten years, Darren is one of the more experienced officers. However, although he has a high level of technological sophistication he very rarely uses the CCTV system in a proactive way, relying instead on incidents to be called to his attention by the security

officers who are patrolling the mall. He spends most his time reading tabloid newspapers, particularly the horse racing section:

Shift 5: Monday 21 October 2002

I arrive in the control room at 09.00 on Monday morning to begin a very uneventful day. Darren is back from his two-week holidays and spends most of the day reading his newspapers. The CCTV system is not used proactively during the entire eight-hour shift. Darren sat for what seemed like hours at the control desk and at one point it looked like his head was nodding and it sounded like he was snoring. During these long periods of inactivity he was occasionally brought to attention by the buzzing sounds of the intercom systems, and, startled, he would reach across the control desk to press a button to open the remotely operated access control gates to allow vehicles into the shopping malls delivery areas.

When an incident is brought to the attention of the CCTV operator from someone outside of the system he or she can respond in three ways. Firstly, the CCTV operator can use the system to provide information that will help those on the mall during a targeted surveillance. When this happens the CCTV system is fully 'integrated' with deployment practice. Secondly, the CCTV operator may acknowledge the message that has come from outside the system but provides only a 'tokenistic' response to the unfolding incident. The third level of response to incidents brought to the attention of CCTV operators is no response at all. Here incidents are completely ignored regardless of the 'seriousness' or 'urgency' of the message that comes from outside the system. Take Darren's response in the following incident:

Targeted Surveillance 7 (Shift 9 at 15.07 – not identified)

At 15.07 Darren is sitting at the control desk with his eyes closed when he receives a call on the Emergency Telephone for the 'Crime Prevention Shop'. He leans forward and presses the button on the hands-free receiver: 'control to all guards. Can you be on the look out for two IC3 males? If you see them can you take them to Crime Prevention?' Darren sits back in his chair and makes no attempt to find the two boys on camera. Out of the four guards on the mall, only Misha responds to his message. A couple of minutes later an urgent sounding message comes across on the radio from Stephen, the Senior Contracts Manager, who is on the mall: 'Control, Charlie Mike speaking. Could you and all guards look out for two IC3 boys? One of them is wearing blue trousers and a purple top. The mother is very distraught'. Once again, only Misha responds to this message and Darren makes no attempt to find the boys on camera.

At 15.21 Stephen contacts the control room on the radio link: 'control and all stations. We've found the two boys over'.

Darren: 'yes, received that'.

3.4 Summary

As a number of writers have shown, the way CCTV systems work in practice is highly 'context dependent' (Norris and Armstrong, 1999; McCahill, 2002). The same technological infrastructure can be used in very different ways depending upon how it fits in with the existing organisational and occupational concerns of those operating the

systems in different settings. For instance, Norris and Armstrong (1999) found that there were marked variations in the operational procedures of open-street CCTV systems depending upon the extent of integration with police deployment practice. Similarly, in his study of the use of CCTV in shopping malls and the industrial work place, McCahill (2002) found that the ability of system managers to mobilise a response to monitored non-compliance was constrained by local cultural traditions and class solidarities amongst low-level security officers who often identified more with those under surveillance than with their superiors.

Similarly, in the present case study we have seen how the use (or 'non-use') of the system was shaped by high levels of organisational conflict which produced a divided and disillusioned work force. This was reflected in our findings which showed that in 120 hours of observation there were just 84 targeted surveillances. This represented just over five targeted surveillances per eight-hour shift. Moreover, only 29 (35%) of the targeted surveillances were the result of 'proactive' use of the system by CCTV operators. The remaining 55 (66%) of targeted surveillances were initiated by someone from outside the control room.

However, not all security officers responded in the same way to organisational conflict. Thus, operational procedures on this site were shaped not only by cultural traditions and organisational practices; they were also shaped by the individual concerns of those working within the same organisation. In an attempt to explain how CCTV systems are shaped by particular individuals we constructed a typology of the orientation of security officers to their job. Our typology showed that there is a wide variation in the extent to which individuals expect or reject organisational goals and the technological means for achieving those goals. For instance, one of the main reasons for 'non-use' of the system is that Darren, the shopping mall's main CCTV operator, is a 'work avoider'. During the period of observation, Darren sat at the control desk during thirteen of the fifteen eight hour shifts. However, he was only responsible for 4 (14%) of the 29 targeted surveillances initiated by a CCTV operator. During the period of observation Darren was relieved periodically for breaks usually by Harry who is the other main CCTV operator. Harry, as we know, was a 'techno-work embracer' or 'crime fighter' who used the system proactively. Thus although Harry only sat at the control desk while Darren took his breaks, he was responsible for 22 (76%) of the 29 targeted surveillances initiated by a CCTV operator.

Of course, it may be that in time the concerns of particular individuals become subsumed by the general 'occupational culture' of the organisation. If this is the case, it may be that the whole work force eventually falls into line behind the dominant organisational and occupational ethos of 'crime fighting' or 'work avoidance'. At South London Mall, for example, it became clear towards the end of the period of observation that Harry ('techo-work embracer') and Misha ('work-embracer') were becoming increasingly disillusioned with their jobs. By the end of the period of observation Misha

expressed a desire to leave the mall, while Harry began to arrive late for work. Moreover, when Harry did arrive he usually read the newspaper and began to visit the new Health Centre during working hours. He even joined Darren in the bookies on one or two occasions. In other words, Harry became a 'work avoider'. This may be only temporary though, because he is planning to leave the mall to become a real 'crime fighter' when he joins the Metropolitan Police Force.

4 Discussion

In our concluding discussion we want to highlight four key themes that emerge from our analysis.

Diversity: *One cannot make any generalisations about the extent, nature and impact of CCTV surveillance from the mere existence of a system. CCTV systems have diverse operating procedures, staffing policies and levels of technological sophistication.*

The systems run by Wandsworth Council and South West Trains were quite similar in that they were both multi-million pound operations with brand new equipment and CCTV control rooms. CCTV operators at both of these sites had completed extensive training programmes and two of the employees in the control centre at Wimbledon were graduates. Similarly, the system at West London Mall was a brand new digital system with long-serving members of staff who appeared highly-trained and highly-motivated. However, at South London Mall things were very different. To begin with, the CCTV system is over twenty years old and during the period of observation several cameras were out of action. The control room itself consists of battered old furniture and there are no proper kitchen facilities where the staff can make drinks during breaks. Moreover, while the images from all the cameras are recorded there is a three-second time-lapse and no 'real-time' recording. There is no Code of Practice at this site and training procedures for new security guards appears to be a bit haphazard.

There was also variation in the way the systems were used in practice. Thus while system managers at all four sites stated that the main aims of the systems were 'to deter crime and to provide public reassurance', in practice the systems were used for a wide range of general managerial purposes. For example, the public CCTV network at Wandsworth was used for 'street cleansing' and 'traffic management' and the system at SW Trains was used for 'crowd control'. In addition, many of the cameras in the mainline railway stations were used in conjunction with a 'Help Point' system for the purpose of 'customer service'. Meanwhile, at West London Mall one of the main uses of the system was to monitor groups of 'troublesome' youths who congregated in the mall (see also, McCahill, 2002). In contrast, the CCTV operators at South London Mall were more concerned with 'known problem families' who lived in the near vicinity.

The surveillance web: *There is an increasing tendency for systems to become embedded in a complex social and technological web of surveillance which extends and diffuses the impact of the surveillance gaze to a range of other control agencies.*

For instance, the images from Wandsworth's public CCTV network (which are monitored by a combination of council officers and police officers) can be relayed to three local police stations. The CCTV operators also have a handset for a borough wide Retail Radio Link. This allows the CCTV operators to communicate with local beat officers who carry a handset whilst patrolling the streets and 175 businesses (around 35 in each of the

borough's five town centres). Also on the Retail Radio system are the borough's Street Patrollers who work very closely with their colleagues in the Metropolitan Police at Lavender Hill Police Station. Similarly, the CCTV operators at SW Trains liaise very closely with the police and local businesses. For instance, police officers are often based in the control room for various exercises, and there is two-way communication via a radio link between CCTV operators and Travel Safe Officers who are coordinated by the British Transport Police. CCTV operators also have radio link with the staff at Wimbledon Train Station. The latter have a separate City Centre Radio Link which allows them to communicate with the retailers in Wimbledon town centre. Finally, at West London Mall CCTV operators can communicate with security officers and shop staff in many of the mall stores and with local police officers while they patrol the beat. Similarly, CCTV operators at South London Mall have access to a Retail Radio that allows them to communicate with town centre businesses and with police officers who are based in a local Crime Prevention Shop.

The human mediation of technology: *The operation and impacts of systems have to be understood as the outcome of the interplay between technological, organisational and cultural factors.*

To understand the impact of a CCTV system attention has to be paid to the degree of integration between the control room operatives and those responsible for authoritative intervention on the street. At South London Mall, for example, the integration of the CCTV system with police deployment practice was hindered by the level of organisational conflict between private security officers and the police. At one point, police officers based in a local Crime Prevention Shop had a radio handset which allowed them to communicate with security officers in the mall. However, when relations between the security officers and the local police became fraught with conflict and tension, the security team took back their radio hand-set because of 'police interference' during unfolding incidents. Also, previously on this site CCTV operators were able to access pictures from the council's open-street CCTV system. This facility was removed, however, when it was discovered that CCTV operators had been 'watching things they were not supposed to be watching; girls walking down the street and things like that' (CCTV operator). Operational procedures, as we have seen, are also shaped by the personal and culturally constituted perspectives of the control room staff. As our typology of security officers shows, the way CCTV systems are used in practice depends to a large degree on how particular individuals adapt to both organisational goals and the technological infrastructure used to achieve those goals.

Exclusion: *The growth of CCTV in semi-private spaces brings with it an increasing emphasis on exclusion as the dominant strategy of social control.*

At SW Trains there are plans to use the CCTV system to enforce Anti-Social Behaviour Orders (ASBO) to keep 'undesirables' away from train stations, whilst at South London

Mall exclusionary practices are shaped by the discretionary powers of private security officers. On this site, most ejections from the mall were reserved for 'known troublecausers' and 'shoplifters'. A similar story was found at West London Mall where the information on 'banning orders' was relayed through the shifts so that all security officers knew who was banned. One problem with these practices, as von Hirsch and Shearing (2000: 90) have argued, 'relates to the possible unfairness of the procedure for determining that a criminal violation has occurred'. On some occasions, for example, it appeared that exclusionary practices at South London Mall were based more on the whim of the security officers than on the behaviour of those who were ejected. As one CCTV operator put it when asked if a suspect was banned, 'if he's looking really scruffy or he's drunk, then we throw him out of the centre'. The use of these practices represents a shift from formal and legally regulated measures of crime control and order maintenance towards private and unaccountable justice.

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